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ABSTRACT 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the US 
government has become increasingly concerned with madrassas, Islamic 
schools of religious education in Central and South Asia.  U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell denounced these 
religious seminaries as radical institutions which produce Islamic jihadists 
capable of threatening U.S. national security and interests.       
This thesis examines the history and current evidence available on 
madrassas.  Specifically, it analyzes their historical evolution and reaction to 
domestic, regional and international developments. It finds that there is little 
evidence to connect madrassas to transnational terrorism, and that they are not a 
direct threat to the United States. However, Pakistani madrassas do have ties to 
domestic and regional violence, particularly Sunni-Shia sectarian violence in 
Pakistan and the Pakistani-Indian conflict in Kashmir, making them a regional 
security concern. This thesis argues that the best path for combating religious 
militancy in madrassas is by helping to create better alternatives to madrassa 
education, including state run and private schools, and not by targeting 
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In a memorandum dated 16 October 2003, then-Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld posed the following to his Deputy Defense Secretaries and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
 
Today, we lack the metrics to know if we are winning or losing the 
global war on terror.  Are we capturing, killing or deterring and 
dissuading more terrorists everyday than the madrassas and the 
radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?1  
 
The debate over the possible link between Muslim militancy and Muslim 
religious schools, which are known as a madrassa (this paper will use the 
common current plural form of madrassas in lieu of the correct Arabic plural - 
madaris), actually pre-dates the September 11,attacks.  After 9/11, this debate 
drew more attention as America looked for reasons behind the actions of the 
nineteen Muslim men involved.  Britain began asking similar questions after the 
July 2005 London subway bombing, when it was announced that three of the 
suicide bombers recently traveled to Pakistan seeking religious training.  No 
evidence has been uncovered to link any of the 9/11 attackers or London subway 
bombers to madrassas or even any formal Islamic education.2  Even with the 
lack of corroborating evidence, politicians in Great Britain and the United States 
continue to speculate that links exist between Islamic religious schools, 
madrassas, and increased Muslim militancy.  The fifth anniversary of 9/11 and 
the first anniversary of the London subway bombings re-invigorated the 
discussion, research, debate and study of madrassa and Islamic extremism.  The 
interest in this topic has extended beyond politics to include academics, media, 
and the concerned publics of many Western nations.  Given all this political and 
                                            
1 This confidential memorandum written by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was 
leaked to the news media as was published in its entirety by USAToday on 22 October 2003. 
Retrieved May 23, 2006 from http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-
memo.htm.  
2 William Dalrymple, “Inside the Madrassa” New York Review of Books. 52:19. December 1, 
2005. 19. 
2public scrutiny, the fundamental question still exists: “What role, if any, does 
attendance at a madrassa play in the radicalization of Muslims into Jihadists?” 
In the past few years, various attempts have been made to study 
madrassas and their potential Islamist link.  At the macro level, the data so far 
has been rather consistent in refuting the notion that madrassa education leads 
to involvement with global terrorism.3  To further focus the research on this issue, 
this thesis focuses on Pakistan due to their large madrassas population and 
assertions of their involvement with militancy.  When looking at Pakistan, the 
data does support the existence of links between madrassas and regional and 
sectarian conflict.4  The relevance of this connection should not be viewed as a 
condemnation of the entire Pakistani madrassa system, since only a minority of 
madrassas can be conclusively linked to militancy.  The majority of madrassas in 
Pakistan serve as a source of religious education and training.  It is important 
though, not to overlook the potential impact on regional and internal security 
which the militant madrassas pose. 
Evidence demonstrates madrassa attendance preconditions students 
toward Islamic militancy; however, current data does not support the supposition 
that madrassas are producing global jihadists.  The facts lend credence to the 
argument that some madrassas are involved in radicalization, which influences 
students to become involved with regional and sectarian jihad.   
B. PURPOSE 
To provide sufficient contextual information on the madrassa, sectarianism 
and Islamic militancy, this paper consists of three distinct sections.  The first 
section, which includes Chapters II and III, is designed to provide the necessary 
background information on the madrassa. Chapter II focuses on defining 
“madrassa” and provides an historical background.  It looks at the general 
                                            
3 Marc Sageman. Understanding Terror Networks, Princeton University Press, 2004. 
Peter Bergan “The Madrassa Scapegoat,” The Washington Quarterly 29:2 (Spring 2006), 
117. 
4 Ali Riaz. Global Jihad, Sectarianism and the Madrassas in Pakistan. Institute of Defense 
and Strategic Studies, Singapore, Working Paper No. 85. August 2005. 
Saleem Ali. Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the Madrassas of Pakistan. 
Oxford University Press. August 2005. 
3development of the madrassa as a center for Islamic learning during the period of 
classic Islam and discusses how “madrassa” is used throughout the Muslim 
world today.  Chapter III examines the paper’s focal point, Pakistan.  This chapter 
describes the diverse Islamic community within Pakistan.  It discusses the 
madrassa position and roles within the various Islamic communities. Chapter III 
also examines the potential impact madrassas can have, based on their market 
share of the Pakistani education system. 
The next section, Chapter IV, explores links among sectarianism, militancy 
and madrassas in contemporary Pakistan.  This chapter looks at the role the 
madrassa has in sectarianism and militancy.  To demonstrate the historical depth 
of this issue, key events in the history of Pakistan, which served to catalyze 
sectarianism and militancy, are revealed and discussed.  Also covered are 
events outside Pakistan, which have increased the sectarian division and 
influenced the rise of militancy within Pakistani madrassas.  Finally, Islamic 
militancy in Pakistan is explored and discussed as it relates to militancy at the 
local sectarian level, regionally and trans-nationally.  This serves to clearly 
delineate known madrassas involvement with Islamic militancy at the research 
defined levels.  
The final sections offer a comparative view of madrassas as well as 
actions taken since 9/11 to address concerns.  Chapters V and VI examine the 
differing perspectives of the role, utility and challenges offered by Pakistani 
madrassas.  Chapter V examines American perceptions of madrassas. Chapter 
VI provides a summary of findings and looks at an American policy initiative to 
assist Pakistan with improving its education system.  The most common 
American perspective of Pakistani madrassas is characterized by the belief that 
these schools are widely attended and bent on spreading intolerance and hatred.  
These assertions culminate in a direct contribution to global terror and terrorism.  
While these allegations have some merit, they are somewhat overstated and 
alarmist, leading to a misperception of the true nature of the problem.  The 
Pakistani perception may offer a more relevant and useful examination of the 
problem with many Pakistani madrassas.  While no definitive evidence supports 
4a link from madrassas to transnational terrorism, there is ample support that 
some madrassas have contributed to sectarian strife and destabilization in parts 
of the country.  This has concerned both the Musharraf government of Pakistan 
and the Pakistani population—for many of the same reasons and some quite 
different ones.  However, the majority of madrassas do not play a significant role 
in spreading such discontent, intolerance and violence, and remain an 
invaluable, if not irreplaceable, asset to the Pakistani population at large. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Concerns over madrassas, sectarianism and Islamic militancy in Pakistan 
should not be taken lightly, especially given Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and 
its importance to the U.S. efforts in combating transnational terrorist within South 
Asia.  The issue is more nuanced than most U.S. policymakers realize; viewing it 
as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) fails to adequately address the 
depth and complexity of the issue.  From the U.S. GWOT perspective, Pakistani 
madrassas are a very small concern.  The bulk of madrassas in Pakistan pose 
no threat to the U.S., its regional interests or the GWOT.  Those few that do pose 
a threat—through active involvement of violence or incitement of violence—need 
to be monitored and their relationships to other madrassas explored.  The U.S. 
should focus on assisting the Pakistani government with its educational system 
improvements to integrate madrassas into the existing system as well as provide 
a viable alternative in the form of a modern, moderate public education system.  
From a Pakistani perspective, madrassas are important for educational and 
social reasons, and can not be isolated and/or removed.  Improvements in public 
education, as well as a cooperative madrassa reform initiative, offer Pakistan the 
best opportunity for improvement.  Ultimately, education reform is only one of 
many socio-economic and political improvements that could help reduce 
sectarianism and other forms of internal chaos that lead to instability and 
limitations for the future of Pakistan.   
5II. WHAT ARE MADRASSAS? 
A. WHAT IS A MADRASSA? 
To fully appreciate the importance of exploring potential links between 
militancy and religious education, one must develop an understanding of what a 
madrassas are, who attends them, and what they teach.  In Arabic, madrassa is 
simply “a place of learning or education.”5  A more formal definition of madrassa 
describes it as “an educational institution offering instruction in the Islamic 
subjects including, but not limited to, the Qu’ran, the sayings (hadith) of the 
Prophet Muhammad, jurisprudence (fiqh), and law.”6  The Oxford Encyclopedia 
of the Modern Islamic World defines madrassa as “an establishment of learning 
where the Islamic sciences are taught …a college for higher studies.”7 
Essentially, a madrassa is a school but, due to wide dispersion of 
Muslims, the term can be used to accurately describe several different types of 
schools.  According to Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey,  
 
Madrassas vary from country to country or even from town to town. 
They can be a day or boarding school, a school with a general 
curriculum, or a purely religious school attached to a mosque.8  
 
In some Arab countries, such as Lebanon and Egypt, madrassa is a 
catch-all term to describe all schools regardless of curriculum or affiliation.9  In 
Pakistan, India and other South Asian countries, madrassa describes religious 
                                            
5 William Dalrymple, “Inside the Madrassa” New York Review of Books. 52:19. December 1, 
2005. 19.  
Ali Riaz. Global Jihad, Sectarianism and the Madrassas in Pakistan. Institute of Defense and 
Strategic Studies, Singapore, Working Paper No. 85. August 2005. p.1 footnote 2. 
Saleem Ali. Islamic Education and Conflict: Understanding the Madrassas of Pakistan. 
Oxford University Press. August 2005. 12. 
6 Febes Armanios. Islamic Schools, Madrasas: background. CRS Report for Congress. 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. October 29, 2003. Retrieved May 23, 
2006 from http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21654.pdf 1. 
7 The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, John Esposito editor-in-chief, 
Oxford Press, Vol. 3, 1995, 13.  
8 Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa Scapegoat.” Washington Quarterly, 29(2), 
Spring 2006. 119.  
9 Armanios, 2. 
6seminary schools that provide free education, boarding, and lodging to their 
students.  While lower-income families are more likely to send children to a 
madrassa full time, children from more affluent families also attend madrassas, 
both as full-time resident students and as part-time or day students for Qur’anic 
lessons and memorization.10  It is these subtle variations on the basic premise of 
school that makes it difficult to universally categorize madrassas and identify 
their potential link to militancy.   
B. EARLY ISLAMIC EDUCATION INFLEUNCES AND INSTITUTIONS  
The history of the madrassa extends almost to the origins of Islam.  Some 
Islamic scholars suggest the first madrassa was established near the Prophet’s 
mosque in Medina after the hijra (Arabic for withdraw or emigration).  Called 
Ahle-Suffa, it educated the followers of the Prophet about Islam.11  However, 
most Islamic scholars contend the madrassa evolved in the eleventh century 
from existing education centers, both religious and secular.   
As the Muslim empire expanded beyond Arabia in the seventh century, it 
entered regions with a history of academic institutions dating back over a 
thousand years to the Greek and Persian empires.12  After the Muslims acquired 
these classical institutions, they began a concerted effort to translate the 
incredible body of knowledge these institutions contained into Arabic.  Using 
these schools as translation centers, scholars translated a significant number of 
the ancients into Arabic in less than two hundred years, thereby saving many of 
these writings for future generations.  In addition to preserving knowledge from 
pre-Islamic empires, these academies also educated Muslim scholars and 





                                            
10 Ali, 13. 
11 Ibid., 15. 
12 Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Traditional Islam in the Modern World. KPI Limited, 1987, 129. 
7translation and study, Islamic scholars were exposed to the scientific and 
philosophic heritage of these previous empires, which they successfully 
integrated into Islamic academic endeavors.13     
From the beginning of Islam, the mosque was recognized as the first and 
most important institution of Islamic education.14  The mosque’s role as an 
education center of Islam began during the first century of the hijra, but it was 
during the second century that the mosque was confirmed as the leading institute 
of Islamic learning.  While no set curriculum existed, the education mosques 
provided was focused on teaching the works of the Prophet and the Arabic 
language.  Arabic studies were particularly important because it was believed 
that the best way to ensure the purity of Islam was to teach it in its revealed 
language.  Other educational topics of the mosques are described as “different 
sciences revolving mainly around religious themes.”15  Since most Muslims 
considered acquisition of knowledge a religious obligation, practically no subject 
was barred from study within a mosque.16  It was during this period that another 
center of Islamic learning was also development: the kuttab. 
 The kuttab served as the elementary education institution in the Muslim 
world.  The kuttab (plural, katatib) actually existed in pre-Islamic Arabia but 
during the second century of the hijra it became widespread due to its role as a 
center for basic Islamic education.17  Katatib proved important during the 
Arabization of the new Muslim empire because it focused on teaching Arabic and 
the Qur’an.  Katatib varied across the Muslim world, in some areas katatib taught 
arithmetic as well as reading, writing and the Qur’an.  In general, most katatib 
focused entirely on the Qur’an.  Students are taught to read and recite portions, if 
not all, of the Qur’an, as well some writing skills by copying passages.18   
                                            
13 Nasr, 130. 
14 Hisham Nashabe. Muslim Education Institutions. Library of Lebannon, 1989, 14. 
15 Ibid., 17. 
16 Ibid., 26. 
17 Ibid., 18. 
18 Ibid., 30. 
8After three and half centuries of conquest, expansion and colonization, the 
Muslim empire stretched from the Iberian Peninsula down through North Africa 
and across Arabia to Persia and the Indian Sub-continent.  To assist in 
maintaining this empire, Muslim leaders declared Arabic as the official language 
of the empire.  Since many regions of the Muslim Empire were not Arab lands 
and had no tradition of Arabic language or culture, it became necessary to the 
transplant Arabic to the frontiers of the empire.  Traditional Arab Muslims worried 
that exposure to the languages and cultures of non-Arab regions of the Islamic 
Empire would contaminate and weaken Islam and the Arabic language.  As a 
method to ensure preservation of the purity of the faith and language of Islam, 
Muslim leaders began Arabization, an official program designed to ensure and 
maintain the purity of both Islam and Arabic.  Anzar describes this interaction 
between the Arab Muslim and the non-Arab potential Muslim as resulting in the 
creation of  
 
…a cadre of Muslim experts who would develop sophisticated 
writings and textbooks on Fiqh – Islamic jurisprudence, Sunna – 
Prophet’s traditions, Hadith – Prophet’s sayings, and Tafseer – the 
interpretation of the Qur’an, to cater to the needs of non-Arab 
Muslim populations. Thus began the tradition of Madrassa, the 
center for higher learning the initial purpose of which was to 
preserve religious conformity through uniform teachings of Islam for 
all.19  
  
 One of the first Islamic schools of higher learning outside a mosque was 
founded in Egypt in the eleventh century A.D.  Considered by many scholars as 
the first madrassa, Dar al-‘Ilm, House of Science, was established in 1005 A.D., 
by the Fatimid Caliph, al-Hakim, to teach and propagate the Shi’ite version of 
Islam.20  Dar al-‘Ilm did not limit instruction to just religious sciences.  It taught 
many secular subjects such as mathematics, astronomy, philosophy and 
                                            
19 Uzma Anzar. Islamic Education: a brief history of madrassa with comments on curricula 
and current pedagogical practices. Retrieved May 23, 2006 from 
http://www.uvm.edu/~envprog/madrassah/resources.html. 3. 
20 Philip Hitti. History of the Arabs. MacMillian Co. 5th ed., 1951, 628. The Fatimid Caliphs, 
909 to 1171 A.D., were the only Shi’ite rulers of Egypt. 
9architecture.21  The Dar al-‘Ilm functioned much like a modern school with a 
teacher appointed to teach each subject and possessed a fairly extensive library.  
According to an inventory taken in 1045, the library consisted of 6,500 volumes in 
subjects ranging from religious texts to works supporting the secular subjects 
taught at the schools.22  Unlike mosques, which served as both a place of 
worship and education, Dar al-‘Ilm distinguished itself by focusing on strictly 
academic activities.23  Unfortunately, the unique education program at Dar al-‘Ilm 
ended only a few years after its founding when the Fatimid Caliph, al-Hakim, took 
control and used the institution to propagate his extreme views of Shi’ite 
doctrine.24  After the Sunni conquest of Egypt, the Shi’i texts were purged from 
the library at Dar al-‘Ilm.  Most of the library’s secular texts were preserved and 
many were transported to the great libraries of Baghdad.25  Dar al-‘Ilm ceased to 
exist in the early twelfth century, after it was closed for heretical teachings by the 
Sunni rulers of Egypt.26   
C. THE MADRASSAS’ RISE AND DECLINE 
Between 1065 and 1067 A.D., Nizam-ul-Mulk Hassan Bin Al-Tusi, a Seljuk 
Vizier to the Saljuq Sultans Alp Arslan and Malikshah, established in Baghdad 
what is recognized as the first organized madrassa, the Nizamiyah.27  
Consecrated as a theological seminary; its stated purpose was to teach  
 
…scholastic theology to produce spiritual leaders, and earthly 
knowledge to produce government servants who would be 
appointed in various countries and the regions of the Islamic 
empire.28 
                                            
21 Ali, 16. 
22 Ahmed Munir, “Islamic Education Prior to the Establishment of Madrassa,” Journal of 
Islamic Studies, 1987 cited by Anzar in Islamic Education: a brief history of madrassa with 
comments on curricula and current pedagogical practices. 3. 
23 Nashabe, 19. 
24 Hitti, 628. 
25 Ali, 16. 
26 Hitti, 628. 
27 Ibid., 410 
28 Anzar, 3. 
10
The Nizamiyah differed from other education institutions in that it was created, 
endowed and controlled by the rulers of the empire.  The caliph confirmed the 
appointment of instructors and approved the curriculum.29  Unlike mosques, 
which were funded by donations, madrassas received funding through “the 
system of state patronage under the institution of waaf (or trust) through which 
the schools were financially supported.”30  From the waaf, the madrassa received 
operating funds, teacher salaries and student stipends.  This economic reliance 
on state patronage provided a lever with which the state could exert influence 
and control over the madrassa.  Still, this first madrassa proved remarkably 
capable of achieving its mandate of providing religious scholars, jurists and civil 
servants.  This led Nizam-ul-Mulk to establish other madrassas in Naysabur and 
towns throughout the Islamic empire as a method of further extending yjr 
influence and control of the caliph.31   
The connection between religious knowledge and law became important 
as Sunni rulers used Islam to exert control over their subjects through religious 
conformity and dogma.  In the December 2002 issue of Foreign Policy, Pakistani 
scholar Husain Haqqani describes Nizam-ul Mulk’s madrassas as “…intended to 
create a class of ulema, muftis, and qadis (judges) who would administer the 
Muslim empire, legitimize its rulers as righteous, and define an unalterable 
version of Islam.”32  The success of Nizam-ul-Mulk’s schools in producing 
leaders for the Islamic empire led to his recognition as the “Father of the Islamic 
public education system.”33 
 For the next several hundred years, Islamic educational institutions, 
madrassas, mosques and Muslim universities would achieve many great 
accomplishments.  While maintaining a firm religious base, madrassas from 
Andalusia (the southern region of Spain), to the Indian Sub-Continent would train 
                                            
29 Hitti, 410. Nashabe, 23-24. 
30 A. H. Nayyar. “Madrasah Education – Frozen in Time” in Education and the State; Fifty 
Years of Pakistan. edited by Pervez Hoodbhoy, Oxford Press. 1998, 218. 
31 Hitti, 412. 
32 Hussain Haqqani. “Islam's Medieval Outposts.” Foreign Policy, 133:58 November-
December 2002, 61. 
33 Ali, 16. 
11
many great thinkers in science, math, philosophy and medicine. These 
institutions would also preserve the knowledge and works of the great classical 
empires of Greece, Rome, Persia and Gallic Spain.  Madrassas were especially 
known for the concept of independent reasoning or Ijtihad during this period.34  
This Golden Age of Islamic knowledge paralleled the European period of the 
Dark Ages, with its corresponding ignorance, brutality and intolerance.   
As history repeatedly demonstrates, Golden Ages only lasts so long.  The 
Islamic Golden Age suffered a slow decline and eventual collapse, through the 
combination of military and economic expenditures required to defeat the 
European Crusades, the eventual loss of Andalusia Spain, internal Islamic 
political strife, and the coming of the European Renaissance.  These events 
resulted in Muslim leadership and scholarship sliding into a “state of decay, from 
which, unfortunately, it has not bounced back.”35  This social and intellectual 
deterioration resulted in a period of introspection in which Muslim scholars and 
clergy questioned the very ideas which allowed them to achieve so much in the 
secular fields of knowledge such as mathematics and science.   
 
The defeat and the humiliation faced by the Muslims in terms of 
both the loss of material wealth and power and spiritual integrity, 
resulted in the Muslim Ulema (literally meaning the scholar) of the 
later days to shun any pursuit of worldly knowledge and go back to 
the basics. In other words, they closed the door to Ijtihad – 
independent reasoning. …. There was depression, lamentation and 
nostalgia for the lost glorious days. In this state of total gloominess 
Muslim Ulema, slowly gained power by becoming the spiritual 
advisors and deliverers of whatever was left of the education and 
the political systems. These murky times in the Muslim history had 
profound impact on the function and philosophy of the Madrassas 
all over the Muslim world. Many abandoned the pursuit of rational 
sciences and focused exclusively on the teachings of Islam as 
prescribed in the Qur’an. Ulema used the verses from the Qur’an to  
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rationalize their stance that the earthly or rational knowledge either 
should not be taught in Madrassas or should only be studied in the 
light of the Qur’an, which for them had all the answers.36 
 
As the influence of the Muslim empire declined, religious leaders decided 
education on subjects that exceeded religiously justifiable needs was no longer 
necessary.  In the eleventh century A.D., Islamic scholars began arguing that 
madrassa education should only focus on the ‘transmitted’ (naqli) sciences 
because they are sacred, absolute and beyond questioning and rationalization.37  
This adherence to the Qur’an, and the lack of rational or independent reasoning, 
continues to dominate the curriculum of many madrassas today. 
European colonization of Muslim lands during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries resulted in further decline in Islamic education.  The 
implementation of European secular education systems and separation of 
religion and civil governance served to alienate Muslims in their own countries.38  
Access to secular education was not universal under colonial rule, which resulted 
in a “dichotomy of the education system—secular education for the elite and 
religious education for the poor.”39  Additionally, the idea of a government that 
didn’t require religious approval to be legitimate further undermined the 
importance of Muslim law and Muslim rulers.  
Madrassas responded in several ways to the perceived loss of Islamic 
identity and sought to diminish the social and cultural impact of their colonizers.  
On the Indian Sub-Continent, many madrassas removed all secular and earthly 
subjects from their curriculum to focus solely on Islamic religious education in 
order to counter the influence of British colonialism.40  As a whole, the 
madrassas of the Islamic education system in the Arab world did not follow the 
example of their Indian brothers.   
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D. MADRASSA CURRICULUM  
Once their importance as educational institutions was recognized, the 
madrassa “gradually became the source through which all forms of knowledge 
were legitimized.” 41  As a result of this, many madrassas divided their curriculum 
into two areas of instruction; the transmitted sciences (naqli) and the intellectual 
sciences (‘aqli).42  The transmitted sciences focused on teaching revealed 
knowledge of religious science, jurisprudence and divine law.  Since revealed 
knowledge was only given to a chosen few, it was to be learned without 
questioning or rationalization in order to maintain its purity.  These studies 
dominated most madrassa curriculum since mastery of all associated disciplines 
was required to garner religious knowledge.43   
The intellectual sciences included logic, mathematics, natural sciences 
and philosophy.  Many Muslim thinkers argued these subjects could be learned 
by human intelligence and were not required to be “transmitted” to students as if 
they were religious subjects.44  Initially, most madrassas taught both “intellectual” 
and “transmitted” science.  By the fourteenth century, madrassas in the Arab 
world discontinued teaching intellectual sciences.  In other areas of the Muslim 
world, such as Persia, Turkey and South Asia, instruction of intellectual sciences 
in madrassas continued until the nineteenth century A.D., when colonial powers 
began to establish rival secular schools.45  
While Islamic scholars argued the elements of the madrassas’ curriculum, 
the supporters of madrassas also weighed in on the content of madrassa 
teachings.  Muslim rulers, who supported madrassas through endowments, 
sought to use madrassas to propagate state ideology and as tools of social 
control.46  To accomplish this, Muslim rulers directly and indirectly influenced 
madrassa curriculums to eliminate free thinking and focus madrassa teaching on 
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subjects that instilled discipline and obedience.  By determining which madrassas 
received funding, who was allowed to teach, and what was allowed to be taught, 
the state exerted direct control over the madrassas.  This control allowed the 
state to directly influence the ulama and, indirectly, the masses.47  Thus the 
debate over what to teach in madrassas had both political and religious 
implications. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The first Islamic education formerly called a madrassa was founded in 
Baghdad four hundred years after the origin of Islam.  While it shared an 
academic heritage with the secular and religious schools of the day, its 
relationship to the official power structure set it apart. The madrassa was never 
designed to supplant the mosques as the primary source of religious education 
for Muslims.   
With the establishment of the Nizamiyah madrassa and its formalized 
organization, madrassas were designed to serve as supplemental educational 
institutions to Mosque schools, albeit with a specific purpose.  The state’s role in 
madrassa funding differed greatly from mosque schools, which were supported 
by donation and contributions.  Dependence on the state for funding and 
approval of instructors and curriculum, allowed the state a degree of control over 
the madrassa they could not achieve over the Mosque and the Mosque schools.  
The state used its influence to force the madrassas to assist it in maintaining the 
status quo.  This resulted in madrassas turning from centers of education, to 
centers for perpetuating dogma and tradition.   
As external pressure and internal strife weakened the Muslim power 
structure, madrassa became the guardians of religious knowledge, with little time 
for research or inquiry on non-essential religious or secular subjects.  As modern 
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which had produced the towering intellectuals in Islamic civilization, the scope of 
madrassa education has been progressively reduced to mere preservation of 
specific doctrines.”48 
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III.  PAKISTAN AS THE FOCAL POINT  
A. INTRODUCTION 
As a case study in response to the “thought process” behind Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s 16 October 2003 memorandum, in which he cited madrassas as a 
source of Islamic extremist, this chapter focuses on Pakistan and its Islamic 
centers of education, specifically its madrassas.  It is important to focus on these 
madrassas for three reasons:  first, is the large number of madrassas in Pakistan 
and their tremendous growth over the past 25 years; second, the implications 
that attendees of Pakistani madrassas have participated in internal sectarian 
violence, are involved directly and/or indirectly in violent activities in neighboring 
Afghanistan and India, and are suspected of participating in transnational 
terrorism; and finally, the important role Pakistan plays in U.S. foreign policy, 
both geographically in Central Asia and psychologically within the Muslim world.   
This chapter examines the relationship between the nation of Pakistan 
and its madrassas.  To fully grasp the complexity of Pakistan, the chapter looks 
at the various, and many times overlapping, identities that make up Pakistan.  It 
then looks at the role of madrassas within Pakistan.  It discusses madrassas’ 
place with the education system, their enrollment numbers, student backgrounds 
and curriculum.  
B. PAKISTAN: A LAND OF COMPETING IDENTITIES  
The role madrassas play in Pakistan must be contained in an 
understanding of what Pakistan is and how Islam exists there.  
The name Pakistan is actually an anagram proposed by Indian Muslim 
students at Cambridge in the early 1930s, which is composed of letters from 
predominantly Muslim regions of colonial India.49 These students proposed the 
name in a plan to develop a federation of Muslim states from Indian provinces 
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with a Muslim majority.50  Also in the 1930s, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, a Bombay 
lawyer and future father of Pakistan, began articulating the theory that Indian 
society was actually two separate ethno-religious nations, one Hindu and the 
other Muslim.  This “Two-nation” theory proposed that upon independence from 
Great Britain, India should be divided into a Hindu state and a Muslim state in 
recognition of the dichotomy of India.51  Jinnah was able to use this theory as a 
rallying point for Indian Muslims to demand an independent Muslim state as part 
of the greater independence movement; unfortunately he was not able to 
translate the idea of a Muslim state into a practical working concept due in large 
part to the diversity of India’s Muslim community.52   
Pakistan was partitioned from India in 1947, at the end of British Colonial 
rule, as an independent Muslim state.  Originally, Pakistan consisted of West 
Pakistan and East Pakistan, geographically separated by India.  These two 
regions differed ethnically, linguistically and culturally.  They had little in common 
beyond Islam and British colonialism.  These commonalities proved unable to 
overcome the social and cultural differences between East and West Pakistan.  
In 1971, after twenty years of struggle to develop one nation out of two isolated 
enclaves, Pakistan experienced a civil war in which East Pakistan, with support 
from India, won its independence and formed Bangladesh.  The loss of East 
Pakistan demonstrated the pitfall of using religion as a common unifying factor 
for a national identity.  This is especially true when one considers the lack of 
homogeneity in Pakistan’s Muslim community. 
In Pakistan, ethnic, tribal and linguist affiliations strongly influence both 
personal and group identity.  Pakistani society is divided into five ethnic groups: 
Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun (Pathan), Baluch, and Muhajir.53  The first four groups 
are associated with a particular region of Pakistan, which constitutes their ethic 
homeland and usually functions as a province of the government.  The Muhajir 
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were Muslims who emigrated from India in 1947 at the time of Partition and their 
descendants.  Muhajir tended to congregate in urban centers such as Karachi, 
where they replaced the Hindu professionals, civil servant and traders who 
moved to Indian-controlled areas as a result of Partition.54  Pakistan’s is also 
multi-linguist society that lacks a common national language, which only adds to 
the complexity.  Layered over this ethnically and linguistically diverse society is a 
complex, multilayered Islamic landscape that is “…far too complex to be reduced 
to a simple binary division since there are a multitude of Sunni and Shia sub-sects, 
local cultural variants and cults, and rival religious traditions differences influence 
sectarianism, religious divides within Pakistan.”55  With all of the factors that 
shape individual and group identity, both secular and religious, it is easy to see 
why Pakistan has had such a difficult time developing a unique, collective 
national identity centered on Islam.   
C. ISLAMIC DIVISION OF PAKISTAN 
The CIA’s World Fact Book reports that 97 percent of Pakistan’s estimated 
165 million people are Muslims.  Pakistan’s Muslims are divided between the 
Sunni majority, which are about 77 percent of the population, and the Shia 
minority, at about 2 percent of the total population.56  This division of Islam is 
further defused as the Sunni community is divided into two main sub-sects, 
Deobandi and Bareilvi, the minor sub-sect Ahle-Hadith/Salafi, as well as the 
supra-sect political organization Jamat-e-Islami.57  The Shi’s community also 
lacks homogeny and is divided into the Athna-Ashri and Ismaili sub-sects.  
Additionally, Sufi and several smaller Islamic sects make up Pakistan’s Muslim 
community.  This lack of homogeny within the Muslim community reinforces the 
existing ethnic, linguistic and cultural divisions of Pakistan’s society.   
1. Sunni Divisions within Pakistan 
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The Deobandi trace their origin to Islamic revivalism from the town of 
Deoband in Uttar Pradesh, India.58  This movement is embodied in Dar-ul-Ulum, 
the Deoband Madrassa, which was founded by Maulana Muhammad Qasim 
Nanautawi and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi in 1867.59  The purpose of this 
movement and the madrassa was to counter the influence of Islamic leaders who 
favored European-style education and desired closer ties with British 
colonialists.60  In addition to refuting efforts to liberalize or modernize Islam, 
Deobandis are also known for their opposition to Sufi and its accompanying 
mythic beliefs and rituals.  Deobandis do not oppose mysticism altogether but did 
argue that adherence to the Islamic law (Sharia) was the path to mystical 
exaltation.61  Deobandi schools comprise a bulk of the Sunni madrassas found 
along the Afghan-Pakistan border and are also found in most of the larger 
cities.62  The Deobandi are considered the most conservative of Pakistan’s Sunni 
sub-sects as well as the most anti-Western.63  One of Pakistan’s larger religio-
political parties, Jamaat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), is recognized as a Deobandi 
sectarian organization.64 
The Barelvis sect is the next major Sunni sub-sect within Pakistan.  
Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly founded this sub-sect of Sunni Islam in 1906 as a 
reaction to the austerity and conservatism of the Deobandi.  The Barelvi support 
the belief that saints can intercede on behalf of God.65  This support of Sufism 
and mysticism is contrary to the puritanical beliefs of the Deobandi.  Because of 
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this, the Barelvi are considered the defenders of Sufi Islam.66  This veneration of 
saints leads to condemnation by the Deobandi and the Salafi religious leaders, 
as well as comparison of the Barelvi beliefs to those of Shi’as Muslims.67  
Jamiaat-e-Ulamma-Pakistan (JUP) is the religious political party linked to the 
Barelvi.68   
The Ahl-e-Hadith/Salafi is one of the smaller Sunni sub-sects within 
Pakistan.  Ahle-Hadith is the most puritanical Sunni sect and was founded by 
Sayyed Ahmed Barelvi in the early nineteenth century.69  Closely linked to the 
teachings of Arabian thinker Muhammad bin Wahhab, the Ahle-Hadith are often 
called Wahabbi in South Asia.  Like the Deobandi, Ahle-Hadith shuns the 
veneration of saints and shrines.  Unlike the other Sunni sect of Pakistan, Ahle-
Hadith do not subscribe to any of the four recognized schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence and are considered non-conformist by their fellow Sunni Muslims.  
Ahle-Hadith beliefs focus on the teachings of the Qur’an and the Hadith and 
oppose most folk or Sulfi Islamic practices.70  Ahle-Hadith is linked to the largest 
jihadi group in Pakistan, Jamaat-Dawah, formerly known as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, 
and founded in 1986 in response to the war in Afghanistan.71  Although believed 
to be principally Pakistani, this group has been linked to terrorist attacks in 
Kashmir and India.72 The Jamaat-Dawah leadership continues to believe both 
physical and intellectual Jihad must be waged against batil, injustice or 
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organizations including the Harmain Islamic Foundation, which is believed to 
have provided funding and other resources, possibly resulting in increased 
political power.73 
2. Shi’ia Division within Pakistan 
While the majority of Pakistan aligns with one of the Sunni sects, 20 
percent of Pakistanis are Shi’a Muslims.  Historically concentrated in Southern 
Punjab and Sindh, the believers have also concentrated in Karachi and have a 
strong presence in the Hunza Valley of northern Pakistan.  Shi’as of Pakistan are 
further divided into two sub-sects.  The majority of Shi’a belong to the Athna-
Ashri sub-sect, which traces authority in Islam through bloodline of the Prophet 
Muhammad and believes that there have been twelve Imams since the time of 
the Prophet.; the Twelfth Imam is believed to be in hiding and will return to usher 
in the end of history.  This is the dominant strain of Shi’ism as found in Iran, Iraq 
and around the Persian Gulf, as well as Lebanon.  The small sub-sect reveres 
the first six of these Imams; they are known as the Ismailis or Severners.  Most of 
them recognize the Agha Khan as the current legitimate Imam of Islam. 74 
 Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Shi’a of Pakistan have 
experienced a reawakening.  The renewed emphasis of Shi’a Islam led to 
increased sectarian identification. as well as a desire for increased political 
participation.  Iran has overtly supported Pakistan’s Shi’a since the early 1980s 
through funding of cultural centers, madrassas and contributions to Shi’a political 
organizations.  The Pakistani Shi’a have used this increased political activism 
and external support to ensure the government doesn’t take measures to strip 
them of their rights.  The Shi’a are cognizant of the example the Bhutto 
government made in 1973 when it declared the Ahmadiyyas sect non-Muslim 
and stripped them of their Pakistani citizenship.75  To counter this possibility, the  
 
 
                                            
73 Rahman, 2. 
74 Ali, 41. 
75 Riaz, 16. 
23
Shi’a formed Tahreek Nifaz Fiqh Ja’fariya (the name was later changed to 
Tahreek-e Ja’Fariya, Pakistan or TIJ) in 1979 to meet the demands of a changing 
political arena in which the Shi’a desired the ability to shape their destiny.76   
Through TIJ, the Shi’a were able to successfully confront policies of the 
General Zia-ul Huq regime.  These small political victories led to increased 
assertiveness of the Shi’a community.  This eventually led to the demand for a 
separate state of “Karakoram” in the mid-1980s.77  The demand for separate 
recognition has increased the historic sectarian tension between Sunni and Shi’a 
in Pakistan, especially as the government has covertly supported the Sunni 
organization to suppress Shi’a separatist movements.78  The TIJ proved an 
effective political vehicle for Shi’a initiatives throughout the 1980s and 1990s; 
however, in the 1990s, it split in response to increased Sunni–Shi’a violence.  In 
2002, TIJ was renamed Tehrik-i-Islami after President Musharif issued a directive 
banning it and five other sectarian organizations.79     
3. Jamat-i-Islami 
Another element of importance in Pakistan is Jamat-i-Islami.  Founded by 
prominent Islamic thinker Abdul ala Mawdudi, Jamat-i-Islami is a revivalist, 
modernist movement and political party made up primarily of Sunni Muslims who 
shuns sectarian tags.80  While Mawdudi was known for his anti-Western thinking 
and writings, he stressed the need to modernize Islamic education in order to 
better utilize technology and other Western concepts that could empower 
Muslims.  Jamat-i-Islami focuses on refuting Western culture and intellectual 
domination, combining traditional Islamic beliefs with the study of history, politics 
and economics in order to prepare its followers to confront Western ideas. 81   
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While Jamat-i-Islami is considered a political organization, it is much more; it 
seeks to be a “community” of Muslims who have risen above sectarianism to 
serve as the “vanguard” of the Islamic revolution in Pakistan.82 
D. MADRASSAS OF PAKISTAN  
The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World defines  madrassas  
as “an education center where Islamic sciences are taught”83.  This paper 
defines a madrassa as a school that follows a structured curriculum of Islamic 
subjects designed to prepare its graduates for positions as Islamic clergy or 
jurists.  This definition oversimplifies the madrassa and its role, especially in a 
multi-sect Muslim country such as Pakistan.  It is important to make this 
distinction because in Pakistan it is common to come across a similar but more 
elementary center of Islamic learning: the maktab.  Maktab are informally run 
schools “devoted only to reading, recitation and learning of the Qur’an by heart 
with a view to enable the common man to perform daily or regular religious 
duties.”84  This simple definition clearly delineates the difference between a 
madrassa’s higher level of religious education and a maktab focus on religious 
training.  
For several reasons, Pakistan has been the subject of much debate 
concerning madrassas.  One reason for the focus on Pakistan is the rapid growth 
of madrassas.  Between 1979 and 2003, the number of madrassas rose from 
1,745 to somewhere between 7,00085 and 10,00086.  Even with the lack of 
consensus on the total number of madrassas, this dynamic growth still attracted 
the attention of those trying to determine the correlation between madrassas and 
militancy.   
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1. Madrassas and the Pakistani Education System 
It is important to place the growth of madrassas within the context of 
Pakistan’s education system.  The Pakistani education system consists of four 
elements: public schools, private secular schools, awqaf or mosque schools, and 
madrassas.87    
Begun in the 1980s, the mosque schools or awqaf are an attempt by the 
Pakistani government to extend education to remote and outlying areas.  The 
idea was to combine basic secular education in Urdu with the religious instruction 
already being conducted at most mosques.88  The Pakistani Government 
provides funding and curriculum for these mosques’ schools.  The major 
weakness of this program is that many of the imams lack the formal education 
necessary to teach the secular subjects.89  The Pakistani Government agency 
responsible for administrating religious charitable trusts oversees the awqafs and 
has enacted a program to hire part-time teachers to assist imams with instruction 
in the government-mandated secular subjects.90  Unfortunately, after almost 
twenty years of existence, little empirical information is available as to the 
effectiveness of the awqaf.91   
The final element of the Pakistan education system is the madrassas.  
There are two primary distinguishing differences between awqaf and madrassas.  
First, madrassas receive the majority of their funding from sources other than the 
government, unlike their historical precedence in eleventh century Baghdad.92  
Most resources are supplied to the madrassas by their affiliated religious sect 
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and the sect’s external supporters.  Acceptance of government resources is 
voluntary and many madrassas do not seek government support.  Typically, 
government support to madrassas comes in the form of land grants.93  Recently, 
the government has begun to offer incentives of money, books and supplies, and 
technology to madrassas that participate in the renewed voluntary madrassa 
registration campaign.94 
The second major difference is the lack of government oversight: the 
madrassas’ curriculum, operation and resourcing are not subject to government 
inspection or interference.  In the mid-1970s, following Pakistan’s civil war and 
the creation of Bangladesh, Bhutto nationalized education but left the madrassas 
free of government control in order to consolidate support from the various 
Islamic factions.95  Unlike awqaf schools, madrassas are not required to teach 
the government-mandated secular subjects. The madrassa’s curriculum typically 
focuses heavily on learning Islamic subjects in Arabic or Persian.  Many 
madrassas teach a variety of secular subjects, but this instruction is usually 
couched in the idea that this learning is to help expand the reach of Islam.   
2. School Enrollment in Pakistan 
The lack of a comprehensive census of education institutions in Pakistan 
results in a high degree of uncertainty as to the impact of each element.  The 
Education and School Atlas of Pakistan, a 2002 UNICEF report, estimated that 
enrollment the Pakistani national education system consisted of about 23.5 
million students ages 5 to 19.  Public school enrollment was approximately 16 
million children in 150,000 public schools.  Private secular schools accounted for 
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enrolled in 25,000 awqaf schools.96  It is also important to note that Pakistan’s 
student enrollment constitutes less than half, approximately 42 percent, of the 
eligible population of children ages 5 to 19.97 
The estimates of the number of madrassas and students cover a large 
range.  At the high end, a Brookings Institute paper estimated Pakistan has some 
45,000 madrassas98 but was unable to validate this data or provide an estimated 
student population.99  A more commonly recognized and quoted figure of 
Pakistani madrassas and their enrollment are from a 2002 report by International 
Crisis Group (ICG) which estimated 10,000 madrassas with an estimated 
enrollment of 1.5 million students.100  Since the report’s release, other 
researchers have identified errors in ICG’s enrollment number.101  Andrabi and 
his associates argue that the ICG report may overstate enrollment numbers by 
as much as a factor of 10.  By contrast, Andrabi’s best estimates indicate 
madrassa enrollment during the same periods as between 410,000 and 475,000 
or about 3 percent of total school enrollment.102  The incongruity among sources 
and reported data on the number of madrassas and their enrollment only serves 
to confuse the issue even more.   
Other researchers see the problem of establishing a credible census on 
the number of madrassas in Pakistan as more than conflicting data.  Christine 
Fair, a South Asian expert at the U.S. Institute for Peace, argues that four 
conditions exist to exacerbate the issue of determining the number of madrassas 
in Pakistan to the point of near impossibility.   
 
 
                                            
96 Ali, 22. 
97 Tahir Andrabi, Jishnu Das,Asim Ijaz Khwaja, & Tristan Zajonc. Religious School 
Enrollment in Pakistan: A look at the data.. KSG RWP 05-024, 2005. 4. 
98 P.W. Singer. Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a system of education not Jihad. Brookings 
Institute Analysis Paper 14. 2001. 2 
99 Andrabi, et al., 7. 
100 ICG Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military. 2. 
101 Riaz.11. 
102 Andrabi, et al., 12 and 14. 
28
First, many popular media reports likely have conflated madrassas 
with maktab and may be dramatically overestimating madrassas 
numbers. Second, there is no extant central database of registered 
madaris. Registration happens at the district [level], and those 
documents are all in hardcopy filed with local governments. Third, it 
is highly likely that those records are woefully out of date. Fourth, 
records are only for registered madrassas.103 
      
The Pakistani government traditionally had little oversight on madrassas, 
which led to much speculation as to the actual number of madrassas and their 
enrollment.  One factor increasing the discrepancy over the number of 
madrassas was a decision by Benazir Bhutto, in 1994, to suspend the Societies 
Act of 1860, which required madrassas to register with the Administration of 
Religious Affairs.104  Bhutto’s decision resulted in an explosive growth of 
unregistered madrassas.  In August 2005, the Pakistani government reinstituted 
obligatory registration of madrassas as result of public outcry in response to 
reports that three men involved in the July 7, 2005, London Subway bombing had 
previously attempted to enroll in a madrassa while traveling in Pakistan.105  The 
Pakistani government has made participation in the re-established madrassa 
enrollment program voluntary and under the control of local government officials 
after extensive public outcry.  Whatever information has been collected is 
currently unavailable.   
3. Who Attends Madrassas? 
When trying to define a typical student in a Pakistani madrassa, it is easy 
to fall in the trap of stereotyping.  In most U.S. newspaper reports, madrassa 
students are described as boys between 8–15 years old, predominantly from 
poor families or orphaned.  The students live an austere existence in dormitories 
attached to the madrassas.  These students spend the bulk of the day learning to 
recite the Qur’an in Arabic from memory or attending sermons in nearby 
mosques.  Music, television and books other than the Qur’an are virtually 
unknown, as is social interaction with members of the opposite sex.  Most print 
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articles are accompanied by a picture of a boy about 10 years old sitting cross 
legged on the floor, studying a Qur’an, resting on a small wooden stand, while 
wearing a white cap, sandal, and simple over garments.106  
Like all stereotypes, this one fails to provide a complete picture.  Many 
madrassas provide instruction on Islamic education to girls as well as boys.  The 
girls are predominantly 5 to 9 years old.  It is during this age when many Muslims 
consider it important to provide their children, regardless of sex, with a strong 
religious education.  The education focus for the students of both sexes during 
this initial religious training consists of memorizing the Qur’an and other 
important Islamic texts in their original language, Arabic or Persian.  Usually 
around age 10, girls’ education is moved outside of the madrassa; however, 
there are a few madrassas for girls which allow them to continue their education 
separate from male students.107 
Another factor that this stereotype misses is the number of part time or 
day students at madrassas.  A high percentage of public and private school 
students attend madrassas part time to receive supplemental instruction on 
Islamic subjects.  The period of this dual education varies by individual.   
It is true that public and private school is beyond the reach of the majority 
of Pakistani poor families and recent studies have shown that children from poor 
families make up a large portion of madrassa students.  What surprised 
researchers was the finding that in multiple-child, low-income families, typically 
only one child was enrolled in a madrassa, while the other children attend state-
sponsored public school.108  This may be the result of the custom of in some 
families to devote one child to religious service.  Survey data revealed that less 
than 2 percent of families with one child enrolled in a madrassa did not have 
other children enrolled in either private or public schools.  This shows that even 
families most likely rely on free madrassa education recognize its limitations.  
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Even with all of these caveats, there are many madrassa students in Pakistan 
who resemble very closely the stereotype perpetuated by the American media. 
4.  Spheres of Influence 
Each of various divisions of Islam within Pakistan support and operate 
madrassas.  This division of madrassas along sect affiliation is important for the 
preservation and propagation of each sect’s interpretation of the correct form of 
Islam, referred to as its maslak or Islamic creed.109  While it is easy to see the 
division and lack of conformity between Shi’a madrassas and Sunni madrassas, 
the variation among the Sunni sub-sect can be nearly as extreme.  It is not 
possible to look at Sunni madrassas without separating them by sub-sect 
affiliation, due to their fundamental differences.  As the ICG states in its paper on 
sectarianism in Pakistan, “The divide within Sunni subsects remains as wide as 
that between puritanical Sunnis and Shias.”110  This division further erodes the 
notion of a universal model of a madrassa in Pakistan. 
 While the Pakistani government exercises no direct oversight of 
madrassas, a governing body does exist.  The Religious Education Board, or 
wifaq, prepares the syllabus madrassas use, and establishes examinations to 
determine competence.111 In Pakistan, there are five wifaq; three Sunni 
(Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahle-Hadith), one Shi’ia and one for supra-sect Jamaat 
Islami.112  These wifaq periodically review the syllabi and recommend changes 
as well as review and recommend changes to material used during instruction.  
When necessary, the five boards join together in the United Organizations of 
Religious Institution or Ittehad-e-Tanzimat Madraris-e-Diniyah.  This collective 
effort is not used to debate syllabus or curriculum between sects but as a united 
front to mitigate government involvement in the conduct of instruction within the 
madrassas (Rahman & Bukhari, 2004).113 
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It is important to note that all madrassas follow the same basic curriculum, 
regardless of affiliations.  This curriculum is called Dars-e-Nizami, which was 
developed in the early eighteenth century by one of the leading Islamic scholars 
in India, Mullah Nizam-ud-Din Muhammad.114  Originally, the content of the 
curriculum was a fairly fluid mix of classical and contemporary Islamic writings.  
In the mid-nineteenth century, Dars-e-Nizami was formalized, possibly due to the 
influence of Western education institutions in colonial India.115   
5.  What Do Madrassas Teach? 
In October 2003, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz described 
madrassas as “schools that teach hatred, schools that teach terrorism" while 
providing free, "theologically extremist" teachings to "millions of Muslim 
children.”116  The Washington Post reported these comments were made while 
answering questions after a speech at Georgetown University.  These comments 
are in line with the memorandum the Secretary of Defense prepared earlier that 
same month.  The comments are also similar to the indictment of madrassa 
teaching made in 2000 by two separate authors writing on madrassas in 
Pakistan, Jessica Stern and Jeffrey Goldberg.  In her December 2000 Foreign 
Affairs article “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Stern labeled madrassas as “schools of 
hate.”117  Goldberg described the Haqqania Madrassa, which he visited, as a 
“Jihadi factory.”118  The interest in madrassa teachings existed prior to 9/11, and 
after the attacks they received greater political visibility.  Do these comments 
accurately reflect the nature of madrassas in Pakistan?   
As stated earlier, Dars-e-Nizami is the curriculum of all madrassa in 
Pakistan regardless of the sect affiliation.  This curriculum covers both religious 
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and secular topics; however, most of the texts it uses were written between the 
ninth and eighteenth century.119  The primary difference between how each sect 
employs Dars-e-Nizami deals with non-curriculum texts each sect uses to 
reinforce their particular point of view or rationalize their particular beliefs.120 The 
emphasis on the Dars-e-Nizami method “lies in part in the superior training it 
offered prospective lawyers, judges and administrators. The study of advanced 
books of logic, philosophy and dialectics sharpened the rational faculties and, 
ideally, brought to the business of government men with better-trained minds and 
better-formed judgment.”121  While Dars-e-Nizami emphasizes studies based on 
maqulat, human reasoning, most sects ignore this aspect and focus instead on 
rote memorization of the classic texts prescribed by the curriculum.122 
The Dars-e-Nizami curriculum is typically based on an eight-year timeline 
but can be as long as sixteen years, depending on when the student is accepted 
to the institution.  The following table is a typical curriculum taken from the 
website of Darul-Uloom Deoband in India, which sets the basic curriculum taught 
by madrassas in Pakistan, 
 
1st Year Biography of the Prophet (Syrat), Conjugation-Grammar (Sarf), Syntax (Nahv), 
Arabic Literature, Chirography, Chant illation (Tajvid) 
2nd  Year Conjugation-Grammar (Sarf), Syntax (Nahv), Arabic Literature, 
Jurisprudence (Fiqa), Logic, Chirography (Khush-navisi), Chant illation,  (Tajvid) 
3rd Year Qur’anic Exegesis, Jurisprudence: (Fiqh), Syntax (Nahv), Arabic Literature, Hadith, 
Logic, Islamic Brotherhood, Chant illation: (Tajvid), External study (Tareekh Millat 
and Khilafat-e-Rashida – these are Indian Islamic movements). 
4th Year Qur’anic Exegesis, Jurisprudence (Fiqa), Principles of Jurisprudence, 
Rhetorics, Hadith, Logic, History, Cant illation, Modern Sciences (sciences of cities 
of Arabia, Geography of the Arab Peninsula and other Islamic countries) 
5th Year Qur’anic Exegesis, Jurisprudence, Principles of Jurisprudence, Rhetoric, Beliefs 
(Aqa'id), Logic, Arabic Literature, Chant illation, External study (History of Indian 
Kings) 
6th Year Interpretation of the Qur’an, Jurisprudence, Principles of Interpretation & 
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7th Year Sayings of the Prophet, Jurisprudence, Belief (Aqa'ed), Responsibility 
(Fra'iz), Chant illation, External Study (Urdu texts) 
8th Year Ten books by various authors focusing on the sayings of the Prophet. 
Table 1.   Dars-e-Nizami Curriculum123  
 
Most of the texts used are ancient works that actually predate the creation 
of Dars-e-Nizami and for the most part are taught in their original Arabic or  
Persian form.  A South Asian scholar studying Islamic politics and institutions 
made the following comments about the works used in Dars-e-Nizami when he 
wrote, 
 
…most of the books taught in this curriculum are very old. Books 
used in philosophy and logic, for example, were written in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Medicine is taught through an 
eleventh-century text that is still considered an authentic study of 
human anatomy and pathology. In what we have described as 
purely religious subjects, the books used date back to the 
seventeenth century at the latest and the eleventh century at the 
earliest.  Books prescribed for astronomy, mathematics, and 
grammar are more than five- to seven-hundred-year-old texts.124 
 
Since madrassas see themselves as protectors of what is pure Islam, the use of 
classic texts in the original language serves as a method to preserve tradition 
and ensure continuity of Islamic identity.125  This adherence to tradition and 
continuity comes at the cost of preparing graduates to deal with impact of 
modernity on Islam. 
Many Islamic thinkers have criticized this devotion to ancient learning 
while ignoring learning needed to deal with the modern world.  One of the most 
vocal critics was Maulana Mawdudi who argued that, being based on 
memorization of medieval texts, the madrassas were not providing the relevant 
education Muslims need to deal with modern life.126  Additionally, many argue 
that being able to read and recite the Qur’an and other classic Islamic works in 
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Arabic and Persian has little effect on students’ abilities to speak or read these 
languages beyond what is required for their studies.  Many madrassa realize this 
and use supporting texts in native Pakistani languages of Pashtu and Urdu when 
attempts are made to enlighten students as to the meaning of the classics.  
Regardless of the texts taught in madrassas, jihad and militancy are not topics of 
the traditional curriculum.   
When looking for the militancy in madrassas, one must look beyond the 
texts and curriculum and listen to the messages of the teachers.  The rhetoric of 
the madrassa teachers, whether anti-Western or condemning the Muslims who 
do not share the same beliefs, creates xenophobic atmospheres in order to 
stress the purity and righteousness their particular Islamic identity.  This 
sectarian superiority and arrogance carries over into the teaching of Refutation or 
Radd in Arabic.  Refutation has been described as “pungent criticism of other 
sects, hatred toward other sects’ members, and siege mentality that is imparted 
from the very beginning of (madrassa) schooling.”127  This tradition of critiquing 
the faith of competing Islamic sects has been linked to increased sectarian 
violence in Pakistan in recent years.128  The institutionalization of refutation and 
the extremist rhetoric has led to “violent social context where sectarian identity 
has become militarized, the negative bias created through the texts used in 
madrassas and vilification of others beliefs regularly through speeches bound to 
produce anger and militancy.”129   
E. CONCLUSION 
 Created in 1947 as a nation for Indian’s Muslims, Pakistan has never been 
able to successfully build a national identity based solely on religion.  From its 
very origin, Islam has had to compete with the various tribal, cultural, linguistic, 
and ethnic identities which define the people of Pakistan.  The unifying capability  
 
 
                                            
127 Riaz, 20. 
128 Rahman, 4. Nayyar, 242. 
129 Riaz, 21. 
35
of religion is further reduced when one must consider the numerous variations of 
Islam practiced within Pakistan.  Given all of this diversity, it is easy to see how 
Pakistani society became so stratified and segmented. 
 Since social institutions are reflections of the societies that create and 
sustain them, it should not be surprising that religious education in Pakistan is as 
stratified as it is.  A more useful and less contentious approach for the 
madrassas of Pakistan would be a place where a common understanding of 
Islam is developed, especially in light of the commonality of their curriculums.  
Instead, madrassas have become the opposite.  Sects use their madrassas as a 
tool to reinforce group identity and superiority.  Combine the traditional 
conservatism of madrassas with their societal role of sectarian identity 
development and the potential for problems seems only to increase.   
The government of Pakistan is responsible for some of the current issues 
with the madrassas.  The government’s overt program of Islamization in the 
1970s and 1980s, and removal of registration requirements in the 1990s, 
resulted in the madrassas moving beyond the control of the state.  Add to this the 
degenerative state of Pakistan’s public education system and the lack of access 
to better private education by most Pakistanis and it is easy to see why 
madrassas increased in number. Madrassas’ potential market share of students 
will only increase due to this.  Even with the re-instatement of the madrassa 
registration laws, the government has been unable to make registration 
mandatory due to the political power bases the madrassas were able to create in 
the last twenty five years.  Historically, madrassas were a state institution which 
legitimized the government.  Today in Pakistan, madrassas have developed into 
a system of education which exists for the most part beyond the state’s reach.  
Despite the notion that Pakistan is a Muslim state, it was and will continue 
to be a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-sect Islamic state.  The many 
secular and religious identities within Pakistan work as an efficient counter to the 
unifying factor of Islam.  Many times the uniqueness of language, ethnicity and or 
culture is only reinforced by the many different ways Islam is practiced in 
Pakistan.  The use of madrassas to institutionalize the sectarian identities is very 
36
troubling, especially given the lack of government oversight.  Perpetuation of 
sectarian doctrine by religious schools legitimates sectarianism, and creates 
conditions favorable to the development of militancy and violence. 
   
37
IV. MADRASSAS, POLITICS, AND MILITANCY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, Pakistan reported 58 registered religious political parties and 24 
known militant groups.130  A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) quotes 
Pakistani jihadist scholar Rana Amir as estimating that “Pakistan has as many as 
245 religious groups, with over 100 focusing on external (regional) jihad and 82 
on sectarian issues.131”  The same ICG report goes on to describe the 
relationship between madrassas and these religious parties in the following 
manner 
 
In fact, all Sunni and Shia religio-political parties, movements and 
extremist organisations operate on the principle of exclusion. They 
compete for the souls of ordinary Muslims and aggressively proselytise 
through their dawa (preaching) organs. Each group has its own 
networks of madrasas, whose curricula are diametrically opposed to 
one another, thus serving to reinforce Pakistan's sectarian divide.132 
 
Madrassas’ support to religious political parties runs the spectrum from 
basic political indoctrination to advocating and supporting violent militancy.  
There is little doubt that madrassas play a role in the perpetuation of Islamist 
ideology in Pakistan today.  This activity is common across all sects and 
ethnicities.  It is also important to note that madrassas have played an important 
role in the creation of many Islamist groups.  This reinforcing relationship makes 
it difficult to determine whether madrassa militancy is a symptom of Islamic 
extremism or a cause. 
To address that puzzle, this chapter focuses on the relationship between 
madrassas and militancy.  The chapter looks briefly at the impact of religious 
groups on Pakistan’s political arena and then discusses several events that  
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greatly influenced modern madrassas.  Finally, this chapter explores the 
involvement of Pakistani madrassas in violence and militancy at the global, 
regional and internal levels.   
B. RELIGION IN POLITICS 
The coalescence of religion and politics into political organizations is not a 
recent development in Pakistan.  These religious-political or Islamist groups 
existed while Pakistan was still part of British Colonial India and have shaped 
Pakistan’s government and its policy from the beginning.  While many Muslim 
political parties existed prior to the partition, one of the largest and most 
influential Muslim political parties was the pro-partition Pakistan Muslim League 
(PML).  The PML was essentially an alliance of pro-Pakistan interests with little 
buy-in from the Islamic communities of the regions which became Pakistan.  In 
1941, Islamic scholar Abdul ala Mawdudi and 75 other leading Muslim thinkers 
and jurists founded Jamaat-i-Islami as the Muslim political party focused on 
creating an Islamic government and countering the secular agenda of the 
PML.133  After the partition, Deobandi in Pakistan formed the Jamiatual Ulema-i-
Islam (JUI) religious political party using their madrassas as its foundation. The 
Barelvi followed suit by basing its political party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), 
on its madrassas.  The Ahle-Hadith Sunni sect and the Shi’a also developed 
religious political parties in the same manner.134  By 1955, secular political 
organizations dominated the Pakistani politics, overshadowing the PML and the 
sectarian political parties.   
Between the mid-1950s and the resurgence of religious political parties in 
the 1970s, religio-political groups may not have been capable of dominating the 
political system but they were using their influence to mobilize public action in 
regard to issues they believed to be important.  The first of example of their 
“street power” was in 1953, when Sunni-Shi’a groups held joint demonstrations 
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demanding the Ahmadiya sect be declared a non-Islamic cult.135  These 
demonstrations resulted in the downfall of the Punjab provincial government and 
significant changes in the national leadership.  Another Islamist-instigated action 
with national consequences occurred in 1962, when people took to the streets 
demanding the government designate Pakistan as an Islamic Republic.136  This 
pattern might have continued had the political elite not increased its pressure on 
the religious political groups to support the government in its efforts to  counter 
the agenda of the socialist political parties and internal ethnic independence 
movements in Baluchistan and Sindh in the early 1970s.137  
Since the 1970s, religious political groups in Pakistan have become more 
active.  In the 1970 elections, religious party candidates won 18 seats in the 300-
seat National Assembly.  The religious parties’ portion of the political sphere 
stayed pretty small until the October 2002 elections.  Capitalizing on American 
involvement in Afghanistan, religious political parties were able to garner 11 
percent of the popular vote and 20 percent of the seats in the lower house of 
Parliament.138  For the first time in Pakistan’s history, religious parties potentially 
achieved a power-brokering role.139  It is important to note this historic victory 
was not achieved by one religious party, but a coalition of six.  The strength of 
the coalition determines its ability to shape politics. 
In the brief span of fifty-five years, Islamist parties in Pakistan have been 
formative nationalist organizations—population mobilization tools—and now are 
integrated political participants.  Some scholars argue Islamist political groups 
have moved beyond political participant to policy privatization with their 
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involvement in internal and external conflicts.140  At times the government 
condones and even covertly supports this involvement, such as in Kasmir.  Other 
times the government appears to be unable to control the Islamist.  For example 
the December 2003 assassination attempts on President Musharraf have been  
attributed to Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), a militant Islamic organization which is 
known to operate in support of the Pakistani supported insurgency in Kashmir.141  
Despite this, there is a history in Pakistan of the government and the Islamist 
using each other for political gain.  
C. CATALYTIC EVENTS 
It is also important to understand that many of the major issues that 
influenced madrassas to political activism existed prior to the creation of Pakistan 
or were as a result of the partition of Pakistan from India.  Many of these issues 
lay dormant for many years as Pakistan developed.  The classic Islamic struggle 
between the Sunni and Shi’a is one example.  In 1963, Pakistan experienced its 
first recorded incident of sectarian violence when 100 Shi’a were killed in Sindh 
province after the government refused a petition by Sunni ulema to outlaw Shi’a 
public religious activities.142  Pakistan would remain relatively free of violent 
sectarian conflict until events of the late 1970s mobilized both Sunni and Shi’a. 
The political mobilization of madrassas was heavily influenced by four 
major events occurring in 1979.  In that year, the leader of Pakistan, General 
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, began a program to “Islamize” Pakistan.  Since Zia was 
Sunni, many facets of his program to institutionalize Islam into the nation were 
based on Sunni beliefs and interpretations of Islamic law.  In order to protect their 
beliefs and legal interpretations, Shi’a banned together and demanded 
exemptions from many of the more obvious Sunni traditions.  Zia eventually did 
exempt Shi’a from many aspects of the Islamization program; most notably the 
government collection and distribution of traditional Islamic alms, zakat.143  This 
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action resulted in a conflict between the state and Shi’a community, which would 
eventually devolve into a political power struggle disguised as a sectarian 
struggle between the Sunni and Shi’a.  
While Zia’s Islamization program provided the bulk of the internal 
influence, madrassas would also be influenced by dramatic changes in the 
Muslim world.  The Iranian Revolution and overthrow of the pro-Western Shah in 
1979 would reverberate throughout the Islamic world.  For the Shi’a in Pakistan, 
the success of the revolution would provide renewed sense of importance and, 
coupled with their success in deflecting Zia’s Islamization initiatives against them, 
would lead to increased political mobilization.  As part of its ideology of spreading 
the Shi’a revolution, Iran provided money to Pakistan’s Shi’a community, built 
cultural centers, paid for Pakistani Shi’a to study in Iran, and even funded Shi’a 
madrassas in Pakistan.144     
Zia’s Islamization program directly influenced madrassas in several ways.  
First, it identified 10 percent of zakat be provided to madrassas.145  This was the 
first time in Pakistan’s history that madrassas received funding from the 
government.  Second, the program formally recognized madrassa degrees as 
equivalent to secular university degrees.146  Since madrassa degrees were 
considered the same formal school degrees, many positions with in the state 
bureaucracy were now available for madrassa graduates.  A prominent scholar of 
Islam, S.V.R. Nasr offered this description of the results of these initiatives, 
“…many madrassas began to look beyond training ulama to provide the 
Islamizing state with its new ‘Islamic bureaucracy’.”147  In Islamizing Pakistan, the 
government was creating a “new educational arena which the madrassas were 
encouraged to dominant.”148  
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This increased political power of Pakistan’s Shi’a community also drew the 
ire of two other external powers.  By the 1980s, Saudi Arabia and Iraq were 
actively engaged in combating the expansion of Iranian Shi’a Islam and were 
concerned by the situation developing in Pakistan.  To counter the threat of 
increased Shi’a power in Pakistan, both countries supported Sunni political 
organizations and madrassas,149 with the Saudi government and non-
governmental organizations most often supporting madrassas of the Ahle-Hadith 
sub sect.150  The Pakistani government also engaged in supporting Sunni sects 
against the Shi’a.  In an effort to improve its legitimacy, the government of 
Pakistan primarily supported Deobandi and to a lesser extent Jamat-i-Islami 
organizations and madrassa to counter foreign investment in the Shi’a and other 
Sunni communities.151  Madrassas had become ideological battlefields in the 
proxy war being waged in Pakistan between Sunnis and Shi’a. 
The final event of 1979 that influenced political activism in madrassas was 
the Christmas Day invasion of neighboring Afghanistan by Soviet military forces.  
While Sunni and Shi’a were struggling with each other to determine who 
represents the true Islam, they also engaged in holy war, jihad, in Afghanistan.  
For nearly ten years, Afghans and other Muslims from across the world fought  
against the Soviet military and its local communist allies.  These freedom fighters 
were heavily funded by the United States and Saudi Arabia who used Pakistan’s 
government and Intelligence Service to manage the war.152      
When the Soviets invaded, several million Afghans fled to Pakistan to 
avoid the war.  Part of Zia’s Islamization program focused on establishing 
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madrassas in Pakistan’s border areas in order to educate the Afghan 
refugees.153  Soon these madrassas were receiving funding from the state as 
well as from various foreign donors and Islamic non-governmental organizations.  
Many of these madrassas were actually formed as militant training centers to 
support the Afghan war and called madrassas to “Islamically legitimize their 
operations and to solicit funds from all over the Muslim world,” and were never 
intended to fulfill the traditional role of producing ulema or even Islamic 
bureaucrats.154  For example, one scholar who studied the Northwest Frontier 
Province (NWFP), which served as a major source of support to operations in 
Afghanistan, derived the following, 
 
From 1979 until 1999, the number of madrassas in NWFP rose 
from 350 to 1281, about a 30 percent increase.  It is estimated that 
200,000 youths from NWFP which participated in Afghanistan.  Of 
15,000 youths who died in Afghanistan, sixty percent (9000) came 
from madrassas.155   
    
D. MADRASSA, SECTARIANISM, AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
Conditions that contribute to sectarianism and political activism exist in 
many madrassas, regardless of sect, in Pakistan.  Contrary to popular opinion 
the traditional curriculum of madrassas is not the source of political activism.  
Mumtaz Ahmad describes the traditional curriculum as, “ultra-conservative, 
literalist, legalist, and sectarian, but definitely not revolutionary, radical, or 
militant.”156  Ahmad goes on to say,  
 
Radicalism that we see in some madrassas in Pakistan today is an 
extraneous phenomenon brought into madrassas by some 
international and domestic political actors who wanted to use the 
religious capital and manpower of these madrassas for their own 
objectives.157 
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As discussed earlier, these conditions predominantly arise from the 
practices of sectarian refutation, the tradition of contesting other sects’ 
interpretation of Islam, and are exacerbated by the rhetoric of madrassa 
teachers.  It is important to note that even with the conditioning that occurs in 
madrassas, most madrassas do NOT engage in violence and are mostly 
apolitical.  Most madrassas linked to militancy and terrorism since the mid-1990s 
trace their origin to the late 1980s.158  To fully appreciate the linkages between 
militant teaching in madrassa and violence, violent action must be stratified into 
internal sectarian violence, regional violence and global Jihad. 
For practical purposes, the review of madrassa involvement in violence 
will begin at the macro level with trans-national terrorism.  It will then look for 
links between regional violence and madrassas.  Finally, the links between 
madrassas and internal sectarian violence will be explored. 
1. Transnational Terrorism 
Transnational terrorism, also known as Global Jihad, is defined as attacks 
against the United States at home and abroad to end its support for Muslim 
regimes they consider apostate and unworthy to rule Muslims.159  As Marc 
Sageman illuminated in Understanding Terror Networks, the majority of Muslims 
involved in global jihad are middle class urbanites with little formal Islamic 
education.160  Gilles Kepel describes global jihadis as, “not the urban poor of the 
third world so much as "the privileged children of an unlikely marriage between 
Wahhabism and Silicon Valley.”161  Bin Laden’s own writings since the mid-
1990s show his frustration with Muslim scholars and the Islamic education 
system’s tendency to focus on the minutiae of Islam and ignore the struggle 
between Islam and modern life.162  
While some of those involved in global jihad have received some 
education in madrassas, many of these same members also attended advanced 
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secular education institutions sometimes located in the West.  When looking into 
the education background of the jihadist, Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey see a 
much stronger correlation between exposure to higher secular education, 
especially in non-Muslim countries, and involvement in global jihadist 
activities.163  This conclusion is supported by data reported separately by 
Sagemen, Kepel, and Gerges.  Bergen and Pandey argue the existence of a 
correlation between Western secular education and global jihadism, since 5 
percent of known terrorists linked to global jihadist terrorism received some form 
of advance education.164  Despite this evidence, many still contend a link exists 
between global jihadism and madrassas.    
There are several reasons why the idea that madrassas are involved in 
global jihad persists.  First, there are a few known members of al-Qaeda that 
attended madrassas in Pakistan.  The PBS series Frontline highlighted this point 
in its episode entitled “Saudi Time Bomb?” This episode included a profile on 
Comoro Islander, Haroun Fazul, an al-Qaeda member suspected in the 1998 
Nairobi Embassy Bombing.  At sixteen, Fazul received a scholarship to study at a 
madrassa in Pakistan.  Reportedly, Fazul received military training in the 
madrassa and then participated in the Afghan civil war, where he was recruited 
by al-Qaeda.165  Fazul and few other al-Qaeda members’ madrassa attendance 
is less significant when compared with a more common trait among al-Qaeda 
members, involvement fighting in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation or the 
subsequent civil war.     
The data used by scholars to argue potential links between madrassas 
and global jihad also sustains the debate.  The current set of data which 
connects al-Qaeda members to madrassas only covers known terrorist.  Marc 
Sageman’s book uses information on 172 known al-Qaeda members to develop 
of profile.166  Only 12 of 137 terrorist on whom educational data was available 
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attended madrassas.167  This correlates to less than 9 percent of the sample 
population and severely weakens the argument of madrassas being sources of 
transnational terrorism.  Some scholars have argued that Sageman’s focus on 
known terrorists results in a selection bias that could lead to inaccurate or 
incomplete inferences from the data.168  Sageman recognizes these limitations 
and does address in his findings.  Despite this, Sageman’s work is still one of the 
best frameworks for describing what is currently known about global jihadist and 
madrassas. 
Ultimately, current information does not support much of a link between 
madrassas and global jihadists.  While there are some known terrorist who 
attended madrassas, known evidence indicates that madrassa attendance is of 
lesser importance that other factors, particularly being involving in jihad struggles 
in Afghanistan.    
2.  Regional Violence 
 While many researchers on terrorism contend madrassa education lacks 
sufficient modern and technical instruction to provide graduates of the caliber of 
known al-Qaeda terrorists, several maddrassas have known and overt links to 
regional militant factions operating in South Asia.169  One of the most famous of 
these relationships is between the Taliban of Afghanistan and the Haqqania 
Madrassa located in North-West Frontier Province town of Akora Khattack.  
Mullah Omar and other leaders of the Taliban were reported to have attended 
this madrassa.170  The headmaster, Maulana Sami ul-Haq, boasts of closing the 
school and sending the students off to fight with the Taliban when they called for 
support.171  This madrassa has about 2,500 students.   
While the Haqqania Madrassa captures headlines and shapes the opinion 
of Western audiences, madrassa are also linked to militancy in other parts South 
Asia. The disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir has been a point of contention 
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between India and Pakistan since the end of colonial rule.  In 1948, Pakistan and 
India engaged in a year-long armed conflicted over Kashmir.  Since the late 
1980s, Pakistan has support different independence groups in Indian control 
Kashmir.  Initially, Pakistan supported the secular Jammu and Kashmir Liberation 
Front (JKLF).  While the JKLF was anti-Indian, it was not necessarily pro-
Pakistan.  In the early 1990s, the madrassa-based Islamist militant groups such 
as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkut-ul-Ansar (re-named Harkut-ul-Mujahideen) began 
receiving funding for operations in Kashmir from the Pakistan Army and 
Intelligence Service.172  An ominous sign of the involvement of these jihadist 
groups was that violence between insurgent factions in Kashmir was almost as 
high as between insurgent and Indian forces.173  In Gateway to Terrorism, 
researcher Amir Rana compiled a list of over 200 Deobandi, 77 Ahle-Hadith, and 
23 Barelvi madrassas that are jihadist in nature or support Kashmiri jihadist 
organizations.174  Among the madrassa listed is Dar Uloom Islamia, a Deobandi 
madrassa known to support Harkut-ul-Mujahideen.  It is also recognized as the 
birthplace of the Jihadist group implicated in the December 2003 assassination 
attempts on Musharraf, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM).175 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) is one of the largest and most active jihadist 
groups involved in Jammu and Kashmir.  LeT was established in 1993 as the 
military arm of the prominent Markaz-ad-Da'awa-Wal-Irshad madrassa located in 
Muridke, Pakistan. 176  While LeT operates predominately in Kashmir, it is 
comprised of mainly non-Kashmiri Pakistanis and Afghans. When the Musharraf 
government outlawed LeT in January 2002, LeT had the largest contingent of 
Pakistani militants on the ground in Jammu and Kashmir—some 1,500 
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jihadist.177  Many regional observers believe LeT’s attack on India’s national 
parliament in December 2001 forced Musharraf to acquiesce to U.S. demands to 
crack down on jihadist groups in Pakistan.178   Despite being officially designated 
an illegal organization, LeT continues to operate with Jammu and Kashmir, with 
bases in Pakistani controlled Azad Kashmir.  LeT also allegedly continues to 
recruit and operator training camps with the support and involvement of 
Pakistan’s Intelligence Service.  Even with LeT outlawed, its parent madrassa, 
Markaz-ad-Da'awa-Wal-Irshad, continues operate and promote its Kashmir and 
India jihad centric agenda.  The reach of this madrassa is extended through its 
130 satellite institutions located in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.179 
These are just a few examples of madrassas supporting regional Islamic 
militancy.  The Pakistani Ministry of Education speculates only 10 to 15 percent 
of madrassas have links to sectarian militancy or regional terrorism.180  The 
government admits these statistics are unreliablel, much like the Ministry of 
Education’s data on the type and number of madrassas.181  One can only 
speculate at the potential number of students this involves.  How did jihadist and 
madrassas come to form this relationship?  
Madrassas became involved in regional violence during the Soviet-Afghan 
war when some madrassas were used to educate and recruit Muslims to fight 
with the mujahideen forces in Afghanistan.  Madrassas which supported 
organizations operating in Afghanistan received support from the Pakistani 
government as well as from donors in Sunni Arab nations who supported jihad in 
Afghanistan.  These madrassas differed from the existing madrassas in that most 
were not religious seminaries but were used to indoctrinate and train recruits for 
the fight against the Soviets.  Calling these centers madrassas provided the 
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jihadist an element of legitimacy and increased access to funding sources.182  
With the end of fighting between the Soviets and Afghans in 1989, elements 
within the Pakistani government utilized established networks to improve 
Pakistan’s position regarding regional struggles.  Pakistan supported selected 
Islamic militant groups in Afghanistan’s civil war, which resulted in the eventual 
domination of most of Afghanistan by the Taliban after 1996.  Pakistan also 
sought to use militant Islamic groups in its struggle with India over the disputed 
Kashmir region.183  While the United States actively supported Pakistan’s 
employment of militant Islamists in Afghanistan against the Soviets, the U.S. was 
alarmed at Pakistan support to the Taliban in Afghanistan and the use militant 
Islamist in Kashmir.184   
Many have speculated that Pakistan hoped to achieve success in Kashmir 
by exporting jihadist from Afghanistan.  Others have argued that the jihadist 
culture, which supported fighting in Afghanistan, had taken root and spread 
beyond Pakistan’s border regions.  Their existing networks of madrassas 
provided them with access to funding, weapons and fighters.  More importantly, it 
provided access to indoctrinated jihadist.  As Ghazi Khan, an important leader of 
a jihadist group operating in Kashmir, put it, “Mujahideen coming from madrassas 
are valuable to us because their instructions and preaching have a far-reaching 
impact on the nature of society.”185   
In the wake of 9/11, Pakistani President Musharraf has attempted to 
distance the government from the jihadist by outlawing many of the militant 
Islamic political parties and jihadi groups.  The government is also attempting to 
exert control over madrassas associated with these proscribed organizations in 
order to appear to be dealing the issue of regional religious violent.186  Many of 
these groups have simply renamed themselves and continue to operate in 
Pakistan, Kashmir, and other parts of South Asia.  
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3. Sectarian Violence 
In 1984, at the height of the Afghan–Soviet war, the United States 
provided $250 million to Pakistan to fund Muslim rebels in Afghanistan.187  All 
this funding, along with the pro-Muslim stance of Pakistan’s leader General Zia, 
resulted in intense rivalry among the various madrassa-based Islamist groups 
seeking to improve their political position and increase their share of state 
funding for mujahideen.188  These intense rivalries fractured Pakistan’s political 
parties, resulting in the rise of sectarian religious organizations that used their 
madrassas to mobilize public support and political power.  As Riaz puts it, “The 
government controlled zakat funds and U.S. money was the prize they went 
after, but to increase their shares of the pie they had to marginalize their 
opponents ideologically, dwarf them numerically and if necessary annihilate them 
physically.”189  The end of the Soviet–Afghan war did little to change this 
movement.  Additionally, external resourcing, by Saudi Arabia to the Ahle-Hadith 
and from Iran to Shi’a madrassas, only served to exacerbate these sectarian 
divides. 
Sectarian conflict and violence is one of Pakistan’s largest internal security 
concerns.  Sectarian conflict is not limited to the traditional struggle between 
Sunnis and Shi’a. Intra-sectarian conflict between Sunni sub-sect does occur and 
tends to be as nasty as the larger sectarian conflict.  An example was the rioting 
Deobandi madrassas students who damaged a Barelvi shrine after the 
assassination of Maulana Tariq Azam in October 2003.190  More recently, the 
April 11, 2006, bomb blast in Karachi, which killed 50 and injured over 100 
Barelvi celebrating the birth of the Prophet Mohammad, has been attributed to 
militant Sunnis of Ahl-e-Hadith, Deobandi or Wahabi origin.191  While this attack 
has been classified as sectarian, it was probably motivated more by political than 
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religious considerations. Additionally, many non-criminal incidents of violence 
which are ethnic or tribal in origin tend to be classified as sectarian.  This 
tendency obscures the true nature of Pakistan’s sectarian violence.  
Sectarian researcher Amir Mir describes violence in Pakistan as resulting 
from “the support extended by the country's third military ruler, President General 
Zia ul-Haq, to the jihadi and sectarian groups during the Afghan war of the 
1980s” and says this support “created these unmanageable monsters who now 
rise to consume their own creators.”192  Mir describes the root of sectarian 
conflict in Pakistan as having little to do with religious differences and more to do 
with political and economic conditions in Pakistan and South Asia.  As he put it, 
“the largely theological differences between Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims of 
Pakistan have been transformed into a full-fledged political conflict, with broad 
ramifications for law and order, social cohesion and governmental authority.”193 
Between 1989 and 2006, Pakistan experienced 1,936 violent sectarian 
incidents which resulted in 2,025 deaths and 4,675 casualties.194  Currently there 
are no data sources that directly link madrassa involvement with sectarian 
violence.  Most of the information on madrassa involvement with sectarian 
violence comes from reports by police and media, or when sectarian groups with 
madrassa connections claim responsibility for attacks.  The limited amount of 
background information results in an acknowledgement of a link between 
sectarian violence and madrassas, but doesn’t allow for the level of involvement 
to be clearly determined. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
There is little debate over the role religious parties have had in shaping 
Pakistan.  Madrassas have played an important role as well, serving as the party 
foundations and as a resource to shape public opinion and politically indoctrinate 
individuals.  The influence of Zia’s Islamization program, Jihad in Afghanistan 
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and the Iranian Revolution are important in understanding Pakistan’s madrassas 
today.  Zia’s program to standardize Sunni Islam throughout Pakistan benefited 
madrassas by creating job opportunities for graduates and funding from the 
state.  This program also resulted in increased political activism by the Shia to 
protect their beliefs and ideology from encroachment by the government.  This 
led to increased sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia, which were further 
exploited by Iran and Saudi Arabia.  These countries began supporting 
madrassas in Pakistan as part of a proxy war on Islamic ideology.  At the same 
time, along Pakistan’s western border, jihadist were establishing indoctrination 
and militant training centers, which they called madrassas, to support the 
insurgency against Communism in neighboring Afghanistan.  These internal and 
external forces greatly influenced Pakistani religious political parties and 
madrassas toward militancy.   
A review of madrassa support to militant activities shows a strong 
tendency to focus on local and regional issues.  Currently available information 
shows limited involvement with the Global Jihadist movement.  Madrassa 
students may be inclined to support the idea, but few have been known to 
actually participate.  Madrassa involvement with regional and local sectarian 
violence is much more prevalent.  Involvement in Kashmir and Afghanistan 
seems to have been initially directed by the Pakistani intelligence service.  As the 
Taliban in Afghanistan showed, these organizations quickly moved beyond 
Pakistan’s ability to control them.  The involvement with regional violence and, to 
a lesser extent with trans-national terrorism, should generated concern about 
madrassas, especially from Pakistan’s neighbors. The greater concern, however, 
should be the potential threat madrassas pose to Pakistan through sectarian 
violence.  
Pakistani sectarian violence is proving to be as much about politics and 
power as a struggle over religion.  The real goal of sectarian violence in Pakistan 
is to increase a group’s political space.  Additionally, Nasr argues that these 
groups use “sectarianism as a means to financial ends”195 to garner more 
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support from internal and external supporters.  Madrassas have been brought in 
to this struggle because they are “recruiting and training grounds for religio-
political activist organizations”196.  Another troubling indication is that 
sectarianism has both an inter-sect and intra-sect aspect in Pakistan.  Many 
scholars and Pakistanis argue the inclusion of refutation of other sects believes 
madrassas’ curriculum conditions students toward intolerance and perpetuates 
sectarianism.  Given the close-to-home focus of madrassa involvement with 
militancy, there is very little to evidence to support former Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld’s assertion that madrassas are producing trans-national terrorists.  Of 
greater concern is the threat these groups and their madrassas pose to the future 
of Pakistan. 
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V. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE OF MADRASSAS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The general perspective of Americans regarding Pakistani madrassas 
may be understood as one of distrust and fear that these organizations are 
producing radical Islamists and global jihadists.  As mentioned earlier in Chapter 
I, both former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State 
Colin Powell announced that madrassas were indeed a direct threat and a 
“breeding ground” for terrorists.  Numerous media reports and academic papers 
reinforced this idea to the American public and madrassas have become almost 
synonymous with jihad factories.  However, some skeptics began to challenge 
the accuracy of this perception in asserting that the American focus on 
madrassas was misplaced and the danger overstated.  Evidence appears to be 
on their side, and perhaps the fear of madrassas and their graduates is merely 
reactionary and alarmist in the aftermath of 9/11.  Before looking at these 
competing American contemporary views, we must first examine the historical 
perspectives of Pakistani madrassas that predate September 11, 2001.   
We will begin our examination of the American perspective with a brief 
primer of madrassas in British colonial India in order to establish a “Western 
view” of religious education in India.  This will help the reader understand how 
Western thoughts on the subject of separation of church and state applied to a 
large Muslim population where little existed to separate the two establishments.  
This will be followed by a brief examination of the American perspective from 
1947 to 1979, which showed little U.S. concern over the growing Islamization 
within Pakistan.  The third section will describe the U.S. interest in madrassas 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent rise of the Taliban.  
Here, the U.S. saw madrassas and Islam as a useful tool in providing a buttress 
to communist expansion.  The Taliban would prove the liability of this utilitarian 
perception after the Soviet retreat and subsequent Taliban rule in Afghanistan.  
The final section will describe the U.S. perception of madrassas from 9/11 to the 
present, showing the demonization of madrassas in the American media.  The 
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latter part of this section will show that the American perception of madrassas 
essentially being jihad factories as depicted in numerous reports and essays is 
overstated and unsupported.    
B. EARLY PERSPECTIVES OF MADRASSAS IN COLONIAL INDIA 
 Western perceptions of Islamic education in South Asia dates back to 
British India, well before Partition and creation of Pakistan.  Beginning in earnest 
in the mid nineteenth century, the British were responsible for bringing modernity 
into contact with Islam with regard to education in South Asia.197  The results of 
this acquaintance served to establish a perception in the British rule that 
education in the Indian sub-continent was in need of regulation and reform, 
particularly religion and its place in education.  The British established a parallel 
public and private education system as well as curriculum additions for many 
madrassas.198 The curriculum was to be one of more “useful learning” that would 
result in skills applicable to employment in the modern world, not the simple and 
limiting religious education that left one ill-prepared for jobs in the empire.199 In 
the eyes of British colonial rulers, religion was to be a separate and personal 
endeavor and should play little, if any, role in formal education or governance—
certainly the result of European Enlightenment and the evolution of a reduced 
role for the church in state government and governance.  Muhammad Qasim 
Zaman of Brown University quoted Talal Asad’s argument of this, stating:  
…developments in modern Europe, and especially the impact of 
the Enlightenment, have led not merely to the subordination of 
religion to the state or the confinement of the former to the sphere 
of “private” life but also to “the construction of religion as a new 
historical object: anchored in personal experience, expressible as 
belief-statements, dependent on private institutions, and practiced  
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in one’s spare time.  This construction of religion ensures that it is 
inessential to our common politics, economy, science, and 
morality.”200 
Zaman goes on to discuss the British contemplation of the dangers and horrors 
that Europe endured before there was a clear delineation between what was 
deemed religious and what was deemed secular or non-religious.  Without such 
reform, the British assumed India would be in danger of experiencing religious 
“horrors” and economic stagnation.  Therefore the British would seek to reduce 
the role of religion in public life and governance in India, boding certain 
challenges for the Indian madrassas.201   
As religious schools, Indian madrassas were encouraged, and in some 
cases required, by the British colonial rulers to teach secular subjects.202  This 
ran counter to the primary objective of madrassa education noted in earlier 
chapters and may have been an underpinning of what Samuel Huntington 
termed a “clash of civilizations,” the theory that conflicts arise along cultural and 
religious lines between nations and groups of different civilizations.203  The 
secular education the British sought in India perhaps undervalued the place of 
religion in the life of India’s Muslims.  The tensions between the Indian and 
British (secular) models of education would surface throughout British rule and 
beyond.   
The Muslim scholar Taqi Uthmani espoused what many Muslims believed: 
that secularism was the path of unbelievers because it limits religion to the 
private life and this is not the path Muslims should take.204  This was reflected in 
the Muslim view of education.  Modern Western states like Britain had debated 
and reconciled, at least for themselves, the place and role of religion in their 
lives, and imparted this secular view and model of education into the Indian 
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education system.  However, no such debate or reconciliation on religion and the 
state had ever taken place in the realm of Islam, nor had it been necessary as 
Islam provided Muslims with politics, economics, science and religion—
altogether inseparable from each other.205  Therefore, education reform that 
included a level of secularization of madrassas would likely always be challenged 
and breed much resentment from Indian, and later Pakistani, Muslims.206  This is 
not to say that the British did not have any appreciation for this challenge. 
The British were not altogether out of touch with the place and role that 
madrassas held in India and were not intent on removing religious teachings from 
them; they mostly wanted to add secular subjects to the Islamic sciences.207  
This sort of cultural intrusion into an important aspect of Muslim life was not seen 
as necessary or beneficial by many, if not most, madrassas and their Muslim 
scholars (ulama); however, the British attempts to mold the colony into one of a 
more Western form would not cease until the independence of India and partition 
of Pakistan in 1947.   
The British and therefore Western view of madrassas was one of an 
outdated system that could lead to the same violence and misuse that had 
occurred in Europe in the name of religion and therefore required reform. 
European Enlightenment had given the British a design for where religion 
belonged in life and had shown a capacity for spurring modernization and 
technological gain. Madrassas as they existed in India were therefore an archaic 
entity and not particularly well-suited for modernizing the state, government, and 
commerce. With this in mind, it is logical to assume that a uniquely American  
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perspective of madrassas would have followed this same line of thought of the 
dangers of purely religious education and the separation of religion from other 
spheres of life.         
C. 1947 TO 1970S 
 Western or American perspectives of Pakistani madrassas during 
immediate Pakistani post-independence until the Iranian Revolution and Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan are rather difficult to discern.  A search of the ProQuest 
database of scholarly articles prior to 1980 that reference “Pakistan and 
seminaries,” “Pakistan and education,” “Pakistan and Madrassas (Madarsi, 
madrassa, madrassah, madrasa),” yielded only a few articles, none of any real 
use in explaining American perceptions of Pakistani education or madrassas.  
The same may be said of a similar search using the JSTOR database, which 
yielded only 23 related articles, few of which gave any hint of the American view 
of Pakistani madrassas.  The same keyword searches and timeline used to 
search the Nexis database yielded zero news articles in U.S. newspapers and 
wires.  Similar searches in other databases yielded little as well.  This is not to 
say that the U.S. had no interest in Pakistan’s education system or madrassas, 
but that such interest, if it existed, was ancillary to the U.S. interest in Islam and 
Pakistan.    
The U.S. courted Pakistan as an ally soon after the latter gained 
independence as a separate nation.208  The reasons for this were succinctly put 
forth by Stephen Philip Cohen who stated: 
Washington turned to Pakistan in the early 1950s when India chose 
nonalignment, and Pakistan, desperate for outside support, eagerly 
reciprocated.  Islam was assumed to confer a natural immunity to 
communism; Pakistan was at once both explicitly Muslim and 
between the world’s two great communist powers. 209 
While this assessment does not connote a perspective or opinion of madrassas 
or education in Pakistan as such, it does point out the utility the U.S. saw in Islam 
                                            
208 K. Alan Kronstat, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” CRS Issue Brief for Congress, July 3, 2003.  
Retrieved September 10, 2006 from http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/22732.pdf.   
209 Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Brookings Institution Press, Washington 
DC, 2004, 302. 
60
and a Muslim nation as tools for containment of communism and the Soviet 
agenda.  It is through this assertion that the U.S. perspective specifically 
regarding madrassas would later come into focus.  However, there is little to 
suggest that madrassas themselves were in any way creeping into American 
thoughts until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.   
The relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan was “checkered” prior to 
the Soviet incursion into Pakistan’s neighbor.  At times, U.S. economic and 
military aid to Pakistan was quite robust, totaling $508 million by 1961 and 
eventually over $11 billion by 2000.210   However, these outlays were not 
designated for education reform and many were cut off during periods of 
disagreement, such as Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons (1977–1979), war 
with India (1947–48, 1965 and 1971), and the Kashmir dispute with India (on-
again, off-again).  Obviously the U.S. was preoccupied with military and 
economic concerns and little if any attention was paid to education within 
Pakistan.  If one were to presuppose an American opinion of madrassas during 
this time, it would be logical in light of all of the above to assume that it would 
have been one of support.  If Islam were truly to be a buttress to communist 
expansion, then Islamic religious education would only reinforce that desirable 
objective.  Such an occidental view of a spiritually significant tenet of Muslim 
culture, while viewed as potentially dangerous today, would not have seemed too 
concerning at the time and the extreme growth of madrassas would have 
followed that same opinion.   
Pakistan’s madrassas grew rapidly in numbers from the late 1950s until 
1971, and secular subjects were fading if not absent from most schools.  The 
introduction of secular subjects was attempted by General Ayub Khan from the 
late 1950s until 1971; however, this reform effort would go unnoticed by the U.S., 
as would the “Islamization” of Pakistan and the accelerated growth of madrassas 
that followed under General Zia-ul-Haq.211  True interest in these religious  
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schools would only come to the attention of the Americans after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, but recognition of the dangers of this development were 
still years away.   
D. SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND RISE OF THE TALIBAN 
 1979 was a turbulent year on the world stage.  The Islamic revolution in 
Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served to garner much of America’s 
interest.  While the Iranian revolution prompted Saudi Arabia to fund more Sunni 
madrassas in Pakistan to counter the increase in Shia influence in the region, it 
was the Soviet-Afghan war that prompted the U.S. to examine madrassas as a 
part of the resistance to Soviet aggression.212  The use of madrassas and 
mujahideen was perhaps culturally ignorant by the U.S. in that it was viewed 
primarily in utilitarian terms and not for the significance this could have in the 
long-term or strategic picture.   
The International Crisis Group outlined one of the roles Pakistani 
madrassas and U.S. involvement played in recruiting mujahideen to wage a holy 
war against the Soviets: 
Special textbooks were published in Dari and Pashtu, designed by 
the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska-
Omaha under a USAID grant in the early 1980s. Written by 
American Afghanistan experts and anti-Soviet Afghan educators, 
they aimed at promoting jihadi values and militant training among 
Afghans.  USAID paid the University of Nebraska U.S. $51 million 
from 1984 to 1994 to develop and design these textbooks, which 
were mostly printed in Pakistan. Over 13 million were distributed at 
Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrassa [sic] "where 
students learnt basic math by counting dead Russians and 
Kalashnikov rifles.”213 
In 1981, the U.S. pledged over $3 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan 
and an additional $4 billion over the following six years, with some of those funds 
finding their way to Deobandi madrassas courtesy of General Zia.214  The Soviet 
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threat dwarfed any concern by the U.S. that support of madrassas would become 
problematic, if not directly threatening in the future.  The cold war perception of a 
monolithic Soviet horde marching across south Asia gave a certain “cowboy” 
type persona to the mujahideen—a classic underdog fighting against incredible 
odds—the God-fearing fighting the Godless, all of which had a distinct appeal to 
the American culture.  Ronald Reagan praised the mujahideen openly in 1985 at 
the White House, referring to them as the “…moral equivalents of America’s 
founding fathers.”215  This was a strong endorsement for Islamic fighters, many 
of whom were educated and radicalized in the madrassas of Pakistan.  The 
apparent preoccupation with the Soviet threat led the Reagan administration, and 
later Bill Clinton’s administration, to ignore the consequences of supporting 
radical Islamists and the resultant increasing number of madrassas.216  The fact 
that the same hatred that jihadists and mujahideen had for the Soviets was 
appearing against the West, and the U.S. in particular, did not register much 
concern by the U.S.   
 After the retreat of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in February 1989, the 
U.S. lost interest in Pakistani madrassas and the mujahideen.217  However, many 
mujahideen did not lose interest in continuing the Jihad, and the newly 
established madrassas sought to continue their existence and spread their 
influence and numbers as well.  Islamization of Pakistan and the radicalization of 
many madrassas, especially in the tribal, frontier and border areas, continued 
and was exacerbated by the crumbling and decaying public education system as 
noted in pervious chapters.  This permissive environment gave increasing rise to 
the radical Taliban and Pakistani underwriting of Taliban accession of rule over 
Afghanistan in 1996.  America’s short attention span had been turned to the 
falling of the Berlin wall and Soviet collapse, proclaiming victory over 
communism—and, in reference to Pakistan, one of nuclear containment.   
                                            
215 Mahmood Mamdani, “Good Muslim – Bad Muslim: An African Perpective,” American 
Anthropoliogist, September 2002. Retrieved September 5, 2006 from http://www.jstor.org.   
216 Cohen, 303. 
217 Cohen, 304. 
63
 The Taliban’s actions in Afghanistan in the 1990s and their eventual 
capture of Kabul in 1996 began to refocus American attention on the by-products 
of radicalization and Islamization in Pakistan.  Links to Osama Bin Laden and al-
Qaeda were established during this time period, as was the madrassa education 
of many of the Taliban leaders.218  This was perhaps the beginning of the change 
in opinion from one of utility of underwriting radicalization and the romantic 
cowboy notion of the mujahideen to one of concern over national security and 
regional stability.  Taliban interpretations of Islam were harsh, narrow, and 
radical, and led the Taliban to harbor al-Qaeda within Afghanistan.  Many 
mujahideen who were waging jihad in Kashmir and India were linked to 
madrassas and subsequent radicalization.  However, perception of madrassas 
would not truly transform en masse until after 9/11, although there were strong 
indications from some American scholars and writers that trouble may be on the 
horizon.    
 In November of 2000, Jessica Stern, a lecturer at Harvard University’s 
Kennedy School of Government, outlined the potential threat the Pakistani 
madrassas system had become, both Pakistan and the international community, 
in her essay “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture.”  Her analysis clearly concluded that 10 to 
15 percent of Pakistan’s 40,000 to 50,000 madrassas promote extremism and 
militancy and that such militancy was exporting jihad worldwide.219  These 
sentiments were echoed in The New Yorker when Jeffery Goldberg traveled to 
Pakistan and deduced that many madrassas were “jihad factories” harboring 
resentment for the West and the U.S., admiration for Osama Bin laden, and a 
strong belief in a radical form of Islam and jihad.220  Clearly a more relevant and 
pressing perspective of madrassas in Pakistan was creeping into the American 
psyche.  Policymakers in Washington had already begun dissecting the Taliban 
to discern what they really wanted and how they evolved.  It was becoming                                             
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apparent that conditions in Pakistan, to include madrassas, were no longer the 
once valued buffer against communism expansion, but rather a permissive 
environment for Islamic militancy and terrorism.   
 In summary, American perception of Pakistani madrassas during this 
period remained primarily utilitarian and self-serving in the fight against 
communism.  Once communism was gone, so was much of the American 
involvement in Pakistan.  Additionally, the classic American compassion for, and 
applauding of, an underdog like the mujahideen against the Soviet giant played 
well to American sensibilities, dulling any sensitivity that this could backfire.  The 
lack of cultural understanding of Islam and the Muslim state of Pakistan was 
therefore evident.  There was no “off-switch” for the type of madrassa education 
the U.S. had helped to create.  American interest in madrassas and jihadists was 
slowly changing to one of real concern, and the events on September 11, 2001, 
would soon force a more detailed analysis of Pakistani madrassas.     
E. 9/11 TO THE PRESENT 
 Immediately after the shock of 9/11, Americans began an earnest effort to 
find the reasons for the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C.  
Numerous theories were espoused and terrorist experts flocked to the airwaves 
and government to explain the basis for the terrorist assault.  Among the 
explanations was Islam itself and the radicalization of Muslims through Islamic 
education.  The latter was of particular interest in light of the exponential increase 
in the numbers of madrassas that appeared in Pakistan in the last 30 years.  
These two variables would help explain the contemporary American perceptions 
of madrassas, which may be described as everything from jihad factories to 
seminaries that teach little else than Qur’anic verse.   
Barely a month after 9/11, U.S. newspapers, wire services, and other 
media began to target madrassas as a cause of Islamic extremism.  The front 
pages of the New York Times read “Shaping Young Islamic Hearts and Hatreds,” 
a story outlining the intolerance, jihad, and hatred of the West and the U.S. that 
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was taught in many Pakistani madrassas in particular.221  Similar stories and 
others addressing madrassas surfaced.  A database search of U.S. newspapers 
and wire services using the Nexis database for the word madrassa (also spelled 
madrassah and madrasa) from 11 September 2001 to 10 September 2002 
yielded a total of 1,183 articles.222  Adding the word “Pakistan” to the search 
yielded 991 articles.  The same search of Nexis for the year prior to 9/11 listed 
only 97 articles. A similar search in the JSTOR database for the year after 9/11 
yielded 20 scholarly articles or publications, and using the same search in the 
ProQuest database yielded slightly more articles and papers.  In the first year 
after the attacks, the word “madrassa” had obviously entered the American 
lexicon.  In many articles, the linkage of extremism and terrorism to Pakistani 
madrassas in particular was strengthening.  Equally as important was a broader 
awakening of America to the religion of Islam, which would certainly affect the 
perceptions Americans would have of Islamic education.   
Al-Qaeda and its leader Osama Bin Laden headed the suspect list post 
9/11 and in Bin Laden’s taped message released in October 2001, he thanked 
God for the attacks and the fear it instilled in Americans.223 He viewed America 
and Americans as morally corrupt infidels and used Islam as his justification for 
celebration and approval of the attacks.  Assertions that this was a religious war 
and a clash of civilizations began to flood U.S. media as Islam came to the 
forefront of American interest. 
A search for the word “terror” and “Islam” (or Islamic, or Islamism) in the 
Nexis database for the period of 11 September 2000 to 10 September 2001 (one 
year) yielded 1,545 articles in U.S. newspapers and wire services in pre 9/11 
America. The same search for 11 September 2001 to 10 September 2002 
yielded more articles than the database was able to present for that time period 
(over 3,000).  Refining the search to just one month post 9/11 yielded the same 
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result, over 3,000 articles.  The same search in the JSTOR database for one 
year prior to 9/11 yielded 34 scholarly articles, while the year after 9/11 yielded 
52.  Again, the same search in the ProQuest database search yielded 72 pre 
9/11 articles on Islam and terror and 986 post 9/11 articles of the same.  
Americans were beginning to inform themselves exponentially about the religion 
and possible motives for the 9/11 attacks.  Although, this is not to say that the 
question of Islam and the West had not come up before. 
 One of the nation’s foremost scholars on the Middle East and well-versed 
in Islam, Bernard Lewis, had outlined what he called the “roots of Muslim rage” in 
an article of the same name in the Atlantic Journal in 1990.  The article was 
quickly republished in late 2001 and certainly with far greater readership in light 
of 9/11.  Lewis briefly traced the history of Islam from its rise and dominance to 
its decline where he found numerous reasons for Muslim discontent and hatred 
of the West and U.S.  The general inability of Muslims to reconcile Islam with 
modernity had frustrated them tremendously as they had been radically outpaced 
by the rise of the West and the U.S.224  This was often viewed as humiliating by 
many Muslims who recounted the glory days of Islam and Muslim rule over the 
“infidel.”  Hence, many Muslims had serious displeasure and angst in accepting 
the ascendancy and dominance of the infidel (West) in the world today.225  When 
this is combined with a view of the West, and the U.S. in particular, as an 
imperialist, soulless and morally bankrupt secular society that supports Israel, it 
can only add volatile fuel to the fire of Muslim rage.  Lewis admitted that these 
views were not common to all Muslims and many maintained favorable views of 
the West, but his narrative presented much for Americans to question about 
Islam.  Numerous other studies advised that certain sects or interpretations of 
Islam were quite prone to breeding extremism and mobilizing action resulting in  
 
 
                                            
224 Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Policy, vol. 17 no. 4, Summer 2001-2002.  
Retrieved September 8, 2006 from http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/533230/posts.  
225 Ibid. 
67
violence and sometimes terrorism.  A view of radical Islam was now taking shape 
and the most recent example prior to 9/11 was found in the Taliban in both 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
 As mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the U.S. view of 
madrassas, and consequently some forms of Islam, was beginning to change, 
especially after the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan and began a brutal 
reign based on a narrow interpretation of Islam and enforcement of Islamic 
codes, Shari’a law and extra judicial measures.  When this collided with 9/11 and 
the assertion of justification of the attacks based on an extremist interpretation of 
Islam, the American public and policy makers did not have far to go in arriving at 
some disturbing notions about Islam itself.   
Leading the way was perhaps Bin Laden and al-Qaeda which had already 
demanded U.S. attention in 1998 through their bombings of the U.S. embassies 
in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.  In that aftermath, Bin laden declared it was 
permissible to kill not just American infidels but also other Muslims in pursuit of 
jihad.226  Islam was receiving a tainted reputation courtesy of the Taliban and Bin 
Laden, not to mention others around the Muslim world.  Although blanket 
condemnation of Islam in the U.S. was derided after 9/11 and offense to the 
Muslim allies and friends of the U.S was minimized by many U.S leaders and 
organizations, an indelible mark had been placed in the American psyche that 
now linked Islam to a greater proclivity towards extremism and violence.   
In a Pew Research Center survey released in September 2004, 
American’s perceptions of Islam was found to be an almost even divide between 
those that had a favorable view of Islam and those that had an unfavorable view 
of Islam.227  However, the same survey saw a significant rise in the opinion that 
Islam was more likely to encourage violence.  In 2002, only 25 percent of 
Americans thought Islam was prone to encourage violence, almost doubling to 
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46 percent in 2004.228  In July of 2005, the Pew Research Center reported that 
67 percent of Americans surveyed viewed Islam as the most violent religion, far 
outpacing Christianity and Judaism.229  The same report contrasts the preceding 
with the finding that 57 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of Muslim 
people, suggesting that the problem is viewed more as one of religion than one 
of those who actually practice that religion.  In short, Americans saw Islam as a 
larger problem than Muslims themselves. The vast majority of Muslims appeared 
to be moderate and tolerant, only the extremists were the real problem.  
Therefore America sought to find the source of this extremism and in short order 
married it to Islamic education in Pakistani madrassas.   
Gregory Starrett, a professer at the University of North Carolina,  
proclaimed that the very word madrassa “…can send a shudder up the post-9/11 
spine…”230  As noted in earlier chapters the form of education many madrassas 
conveyed was a barrier to modernity, suppressed creativity, and bred bigotry – all 
of which were defining characteristics of madrassas.231 Some initial reports as 
early as October 2001 estimated that Pakistani madrassas were producing 
hundreds of thousands of potential terrorists, with one claiming madrassas were 
potentially responsible for turning out over 4.5 million of the “cadre” America will 
face in the global war on terror.232  Thomas Friedman’s travels through 
Peshawar, Pakistan, in November 2001 led him to describe it as “bin Laden 
land.”233  He briefly chronicled his experience at the same mosque that trained 
Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and found the teaching of an antiquated 
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curriculum established in 1707, no secular subjects, and an intense dislike for 
America and Americans.234  Madrassas had clearly been penetrated by radical 
Islam.235 Their curriculum was thought to be archaic, intolerant, and bent on 
jihad. These and other accounts and reports in news media and scholarly 
journals helped to broadly determine the U.S. perception that a plurality, if not a 
majority, of madrassas were essentially “jihad factories.”  Madrassas themselves 
were perhaps thought to be a cause of extremism and not merely a symptom of 
Islamism that had permeated much of the Pakistani state and society.  Islam, 
Islamism, and madrassas had congealed into a very palpable threat in the 
general U.S. view.  
 Tempering this perception of madrassas were surveys conducted of 
Pakistani families in 1991, 1998, and 2001 which showed that less than 1 
percent of enrolled students attended madrassas full time, though attendance 
was higher in Baluchistan and the NWFP.236  These numbers were echoed in a 
march 2005 John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working 
Paper, suggesting that the numbers of militants and extremists from madrassas 
may be grossly overestimated.237  The actual number of radical or extremist 
madrassas is also in question and assumed to be quite low.  The Pakistani 
government estimates that only 10 percent to 15 percent of Pakistani madrassas 
produce militants or extremists, though they admit the numbers may be 
unreliable. 238  Consequently, there is no data to establish actual attendance and 
graduation rates for these radical madrassas.  However, even if the number of 
radical madrassas is higher than estimated, are the graduates they are producing 
a threat to the U.S.? 
As noted in Chapter IV, what data exists for the plurality of all madrassas 
in Pakistan suggests that such schools cater slightly more to the poor, especially 
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where there is no other alternative for receiving an education. 239  This may be 
offset in some degree by the tradition of some families to devote at least one 
male child to religious service.240 This helps account for other income levels that 
choose a madrassa education for their child or children.  However, it may be 
inferred that the majority of children enrolled in madrassas are from poor families, 
as they make up the largest strata of Pakistani society and are more likely to live 
in areas where no other educational alternative exists.  Furthermore, the 
education these madrassa students receive is not likely to qualify them for 
transnational terrorism directed at the U.S. or elsewhere.  “Given the general 
dearth of secular subjects (math, English, sciences) madrassa students (without 
mainstream education) are not likely to be desirable to many terrorist groups, 
especially when higher quality recruits are available”241  Marc Sageman’s 
analysis of  over 100 jihadists and the 9/11 attackers showed they mostly came 
from middle to upper class families, had primarily secular educations, and 
achieved some level of college education with over 40 percent holding  a 
bachelors degree or higher.242  This is certainly not the primary demographic that 
Pakistani madrassas were attracting or graduating.  What some madrassas do 
graduate may be students who are less tolerant and more prone to violence and 
support of terrorism243, if only at the local and regional level.  Even so, the 
American perception of madrassas may largely ignore or be unaware of these 
findings.    
 With this in mind, post September 11 American foreign policy has been 
implemented to deal with the perceived problem of madrassas.  The 
overwhelming thrust of U.S. policy is towards increasing access to public and 
private education, thereby reducing the lure of madrassas.  Competition in the 
education marketplace and continued pressure and support to Musharraf to bring 
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madrassas under some level of government control and/or monitoring is how the 
U.S indirectly seeks to marginalize and isolate the extremist madrassas.  This will 
certainly be a daunting challenge considering the level of permeation madrassas 
systems and madrassa advocates have achieved in Pakistani society and 
government.  Leading the way in this challenge is the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) with a five year, $100 million bilateral 
agreement (signed in August 2002) to increase access to quality education 
throughout Pakistan, with an emphasis on the Baluchistan and Sindh 
provinces.244  Interestingly, the U.S. approach does not aim to remove any 
religious teaching in any type of school in Pakistan; it simply seeks to add 
secular, modern subjects to the curriculum.  This is typical of the historical British 
approach to education reform in colonial India.  The British were not very 
successful then and there is little reason to believe the USAID efforts will be 
more successful now.  
Madrassas should not be overly concerning to the American public.  We 
have seen that the perception of Pakistani madrassas as jihad factories that 
directly threaten the U.S. has been grossly overstated an unsupported.   
F. CONCLUSION   
While it has been hard discern if there was truly an American perception of 
madrassas that pre-dates 9/11, it has been seen that at least a Western interest 
in madrassas was established during Indians colonial period.  The British saw 
madrassas as in need of reform and adding too much religion into the public life.  
This concerned the British and concerns the U.S. today, as militant Islam 
appears to be increasing in Pakistan.   
The U.S. government began to see Islam as a buttress to communist 
expansion and madrassas played a part in producing the mujahideen used to 
fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.  This support, and then the abrupt U.S. 
abandonment of the mujahideen and madrassas after the defeat of the Soviets in  
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1989, played into the Islamization efforts of Pakistan.  Madrassas flourished and 
some became radicalized and used to support mostly regional sectarian conflict, 
while some others contributed to public support for extremism and terrorism.   
After 9/11, the American body politic became aware of madrassas as they 
were implicated in spreading terrorism.  American perception and that of the 
American government turned from a utilitarian view of madrassas supporting the 
fight against communism to seeing madrassas as jihad factories in desperate 
need of reform.  The view of Islam as promoting violence, the existing 
Islamization of Pakistan, and the attention given to madrassas in the media and 
academia led Americans to view madrassas as extremist institutions that 
produce radical mujahideen bent on attacking the U.S.   
Closer scrutiny strongly suggests that there is little evidence to backup the 
level of threat that these madrassas have come to bear in the American mind.  
While it is certain that there are radical madrassas that indoctrinate hatred and 
intolerance, they pose little if any ability to threaten the U.S. directly or indirectly.  
The actual numbers of these radical madrassas is unknown and suspected to be 
no more than 10–15 percent of all madrassas in Pakistan.  The attendance levels 
for all madrassas is estimated at less than 1 percent of enrolled students and 
therefore the numbers of jihadists that these schools produce also appears to be 
inflated.  Additionally, the jihadists from Pakistani madrassas do not fit the profile 
of transnational terrorists that pose a threat to the U.S.; they pose more of threat 
to internal Pakistan and the region.  
Even if America clings to the perception that madrassas are a large and 
viable threat, it must also contend with the perception that any reform attempts 
from “outsiders” and infidels will be met with skepticism and resistance by 
Pakistani Muslims, no matter how indirectly the U.S. approaches the problem.  
This is much the same dilemma the British faced in colonial India.  Even the 
prescribed curriculum reform may hold few, if any, promises for reducing 
intolerance and may diminish focus on other contributing factors: 
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Rewriting books is easier than changing fundamental social, 
economic and political institutions with powerful 
constituencies…because curriculum reform without reform of 
infrastructure political participation and economic opportunity will do 
nothing to stem internal and external conflicts that do far more than 
schools to create violent motivations.245 
 
The above quote from University of North Carolina Professor Gregory Starrett 
asserts that there is more to stemming Islamic extremism and terrorism than 
simply addressing curricula in radical madrassas.  The religious, political, social, 
and economic environment of Pakistan and the perspective of Pakistanis will 
determine any level of success.  Given that madrassas have been shown to pose 
little if any direct threat to the security of U.S., more emphasis in this area would 
be exceedingly misplaced. 
                                            


























In Pakistan, madrassas are as varied as the manner in which Islam is 
practiced.  At their most basic level, madrassas of today differ little from their 
historical predecessors.  Their curriculum seeks to maintain the purity of Islam as 
it is passed from one generation of clergy to another through the use of classic 
Islamic texts taught in their original Arabic and Persian.  This classic education is 
mixed with the rhetoric and Islamic creeds of the various sects and sub-sects to 
serve as a method to transfers each sect’s distinct beliefs to future generations.  
This continuity and transfer of Islam to the next generation of Muslim clergy is 
essentially what madrassa were designed to accomplish.  
 Yet, the question posed to by then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to 
senior Department of Defense officials in the October 2003 memorandum asking 
about a link between madrassas and Islamic extremists persists.  In the end, 
former Secretary Rumsfeld’s question is not easily answered by a simple yes or 
no.  Perhaps former CIA Director George Tenent was mostly correct when he 
described madrassas as producing “foot soldiers for many Islamic militant groups 
that operate throughout the Muslim world.”246  Could Owais Tohid be correct 
when he argues madrassas are becoming the new recruiting and training 
grounds for the next generation al-Qaeda leaders?247  Maybe the most important 
issue concerning madrassa in Pakistan was defined by Maulana Samiul Haq, 
headmaster of the Taliban supporting Haqqania Madrassa, when he said, 
“Young minds are not for thinking.  We catch them for the madrassa when they 
are young, and by the time they are old enough to think, they know what to 
think.”248    
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B. FINDINGS 
1. Madrassas and Trans-National Terrorism 
Despite repeated comments from Western policy makers to the contrary, 
currently available evidence indicates madrassa militancy has not made the jump 
to trans-national terrorism.  Many argue the data is insufficient to put this concern 
to rest and the current studies which support this supposition are based on 
limited data.  Even considering the actual factual information revealed by Marc 
Sagemen that less 9 percent of the known al-Qaeda terrorists attended a 
madrassa, the point of connection common to more than 90 percent of al-Qaeda 
terrorists was involvement with the jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan not 
attendance at a madrassa.249  
2.  Madrassas’ Relationship to Regional and Sectarian Violence  
The contentious relationship between religion and politics contributes to 
regional violence between India and Pakistan in Kashmir and sectarian violence 
within Pakistan.  While the information currently available doesn’t substantiate a 
link between Pakistani madrassas and global terrorism, Chapter IV shows 
connections between some madrassas and regional and sectarian violence is 
clearly evident.  Whether it is LeT jihadist attacking Indian forces in support of 
Pakistani political objectives in Kashmir, Sunni attacking Shi’a in Baluchistan, or 
Deobandi rioting against Barelvi in Islamabad, numerous examples are available 
to show a systemic link between madrassas and violence at the sectarian and 
regional level.  At the same time, it is important to consider that of the estimated 
7,000 to 10,000 madrassas in Pakistan, approximately 350 but as many as 700 
madrassas have links to or are known to participate with sectarian and regional 
jihadist groups.250   
Another disconcerting issue that has arisen from the increased interest in 
madrassas is the inability to predict their potential impact on Pakistani society 
due the lack of quantifiable data as to the number of madrassas, their political 
orientation, and number of attending students.  This lack of information results in 
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reliance on best estimates with high probability of error.  The scholar leading the 
World Bank’s study on madrassas in Pakistan, Tahir Andrabi, noted that the 
colonial revolutionary T. E. Lawrence spoke of the power of a few committed 
revolutionaries in Arabia as follows: “give me 1 percent of the population and I 
will give you a revolution.”251  It’s difficult to determine if Pakistan has reached 
the 1 percent revolutionary Islamist density while lacking the information on 
madrassas and their population.  
3. Events Influencing Extremism in Madrassas  
Virtually every study and report on madrassa militancy in Pakistan singles 
out 1979 as the year this transition began.  The Iranian Revolution, 1978–79, 
served to revitalize Shi’a, resulting in increased Shi’a political involvement and 
assertiveness within Pakistan.  This Shi’a re-awakening alarmed Sunnis, within 
Pakistan and in the Persian Gulf region.  Some Sunni responded violently, re-
igniting the long-standing struggle between Sunni and Shi’a.   Despite this, the 
Islamic world found a common cause when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 
December 1979.  For the next nine years, Muslims from around the world were 
encouraged to support the struggle of Islamic fighters against the Soviet and 
Afghan Communist forces.  This combined internal and external struggle served 
to create a new level of militancy in the region.   
Pakistan became the epicenter of support to the fight between Islam and 
Communism in Afghanistan. while serving as a secondary battlefield in the 
struggle between Sunni and Shi’a Islam.  Internally, the Pakistani government, 
lead by General Zia al-Haq, 1977–1982, began using religion as a means of 
legitimizing his military coup.  The government improved its political power by 
serving as a conduit for U.S. funds to Afghan rebels and through patronage of 
various madrassas used to recruit fighters for the struggle against the Soviets.  
By the time the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, many madrassas had 
matured in their militancy and gained prominence within Pakistani politics.  These 
changes propelled madrassas from their historic role as centers of education to 
the indoctrination centers of Islamic extremism.  
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4. The America Perception of Madrassas  
 The American perception of madrassas has been shaped by numerous 
events and beliefs.  Early concerns over the impact that purely religious 
institutions may have on government and governance gave way to the utilitarian 
view of Islam and madrassas as a tool to repel Soviet communist expansion in 
the South Asia.  This was later replaced by a perception of madrassas fueling 
jihadism and violence with the rise of the Taliban and the horrific events of 9\11.  
President Bush, high-ranking government officials, media, and academics 
painted a grim picture of madrassas as terrorist breeding grounds that pose a 
direct threat to U.S. security.  This perception persists today.  Though this view is 
not based in fact and has been shown to be much overstated, there is little to 
indicate that it will change anytime soon.   
The U.S. government has pledged to support Pakistani efforts at reforming 
madrassas and dedicated millions of dollars to improve the greater public 
education system of Pakistan.  The latter is where the U.S has focused its efforts, 
recognizing that any outside and Western attempt to effect the sacrosanct 
Islamic institutions of madrassas will surely fail.   
Pakistan is a valuable ally in the GWOT and the U.S. recognizes the 
negative impact that a purely madrassa education has in preparing young 
Pakistanis to enter the modern workforce, as well as the destabilizing effect of 
radical madrassas in sectarian and regional violence.  U.S. policy may therefore 
be aimed at reforming madrassas indirectly.  However, such policy may have 
very little effect in reforming madrassas indirectly or otherwise. 
C. U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES  
Pakistan spends less than 2 percent of its GDP on education, significantly 
contributing to the country’s near 60 percent illiteracy rate.  Males receive an 
average of five years of schooling and females receive about 2.5 years with only 
two-thirds of eligible children ever enrolling in a school and only one-third of 
those children completing the fifth grade.252  Embedded in these metrics are the 
purely religious educations that many madrassas provide, which are of little value 
                                            
252 Kronstadt, 1. 
79
outside employment in religious institutions, and the extremist educations 
provided by a minority of madrassas that are viewed to pose a direct threat to the 
U.S.  As mentioned earlier, the U.S. rightly assumes that it will be wholly unable 
to directly address madrassa reform and therefore may be tackling the perceived 
problem through the improvement of the greater public education system in 
Pakistan.  This policy approach appears to be reasonable and prudent way to 
influence and assist Pakistan in its own Education Sector Reform (ESR) 
initiatives, which attempt to address the above shortfalls. 
The following excerpt from the 2004 Congressional Research Service 
Report entitled “Education Reform in Pakistan” outlines the initial U.S. policy 
towards assisting Pakistan in this endeavor: 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is 
implementing a five year, $100 million bilateral agreement (signed 
in August 2002) to increase access to quality education throughout 
Pakistan, with an emphasis on the Baluchistan and Sindh 
provinces. Current USAID education-related projects in Pakistan 
include efforts to improve early education, engender democratic 
ideals, improve the quality of assessment and testing, provide 
training to educators, and construct or refurbish schools in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Yet the most notable project is 
Education Sector Reform Assistance (ESRA), which accounts for 
more than three-quarters of the USAID-reported $77.7 million 
budgeted to date. In this project, USAID contracted with the North 
Carolina-based Research Triangle Institute to 1) strengthen 
education policies and  planning; 2) increase the capacity of 
teachers and education administrators; 3) improve youth and adult 
literacy; 4) expand public-private partnerships to improve access to 
and delivery of education services; and 5) establish teaching 
methods that instill democratic attitudes and behaviors among 
children and educators and draw families into the life of the school 
community.253 
This plan has been further supplemented in 2006 by an increase in U.S. funded 
education programs in Pakistan of $100 million per year for the next five 
years.254 This will bring the total outlay to over $500 million by 2009.  Nowhere in 
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the verbiage is there ever mention of religious education or religious curriculum.  
It is apparent from the initial outlay in 2002 and the subsequent increase in 2006 
that the U.S government sees education reform and access as an increasingly 
important tool to stem terrorism and extremism, and perhaps erode the small 
market share of madrassa attendance.   
 Metrics thus far have been unable to discern whether these USAID/RTI 
efforts have had an effect in reducing militancy, intolerance, establishment of 
conditions that support terrorism and jihadism, or had any effect on madrassa 
attendance.  As of 1 June 2006, the USAID website for education in Pakistan 
lists only quantifiable metrics such as numbers of teachers trained, number of 
schools refurbished or built, numbers of students benefiting form USAID 
programs, and other statistics.255  The RTI website lists similar metrics.  Given 
that these programs are essentially in their infancy, it is unfair to make a 
judgment call of success or failure in their attempts to improve public education in 
Pakistan and consequently decrease the propensity for militancy, extremism, and 
jihadism.  These programs are only a part of the whole, which includes other 
economic and social programs aimed both directly and indirectly at the same 
objectives.  However, bringing the argument back to the focus of the perceived 
madrassa problem, numerous other challenges may make any education policy 
emanating from the U.S. ineffective. 
 Pervez Hoodbhoy, a scholar at the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, 
posited that education was historically not recognized as being as important as 
other government institutions in Pakistan, stating “…it fails because…it is simply 
not valuable or important enough to society.”256  This certainly bodes significant 
challenges for U.S. policy, which most probably assumes that education is 
desirable to the vast majority of Pakistanis. 
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 Compounding this problem is the historical Pakistani mistrust of U.S 
intentions, policies, and efforts in Pakistan.  The pattern of engagement and 
withdrawal began in the 1950s when Pakistan became a favored ally after India 
chose nonalignment.257  The alliance faltered in the 1960s, was reinvigorated 
briefly in 1970, and quickly disintegrated again when Pakistan developed a 
nuclear program.258  This ebb and flow would continue and caused Pakistanis to 
become distrustful of American commitment and gave the perception that 
Washington used Pakistan like “...a condom, throwing it away when no longer 
needed.”259  Such public diplomacy challenges will not be easily overcome and 
will surely cast doubt on any U.S. attempts to change the Pakistani education 
system.  This will further reduce any effect such attempts will have with regard to 
madrassas.   
 Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has had little success in gaining 
control of madrassas.  Financial incentives and mandates from the Pakistani 
government for madrassas to register with the Ministry of Education have had 
little to no effect and remain unenforceable.  The “…government has repeatedly 
yielded to political pressure from religious parties that openly opposed education 
and madrassas reform.”260  Additionally, Musharraf has no control over funding 
of many madrassas and is unlikely to gain such control as much of it is through 
unregulated alternative remittance systems (ARS) and direct donations.  Hence, 
the Pakistani government has had little leverage over targeted madrassas.  Even 
the U.S., with its technological edge and ability to pressure other states and 
systems has had limited success in interdicting or controlling ARS in the course 
of prosecuting the GWOT.   
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This leaves only the American policy of creating competition in the 
education market place to battle the madrassas.  However, this will certainly be 
affected by the prestige and historical significance madrassas hold in Pakistani 
society and the tradition of sending one male child to religious service.   
 Lastly, if the American interest of reducing both the terrorist threat to the 
U.S. and the conditions that support extremism in Pakistan is best served 
through the education policies carried out by USAID and RTI, then why hasn’t 
more money been allocated to the remedy?  $500 million in education outlays to 
Pakistan over the next five years is a sizable investment to be sure; however, it 
pales in comparison to other U.S. initiatives.  One month of Iraq costs the U.S. 
approximately $8 billion,261 one F22 fighter aircraft costs over $133 million262, 
and the list goes on.  While this is an unfair comparison of policy with a war and a 
piece of technology, it does paint a picture of underinvestment in what President 
Bush termed a frontline state in the war on terror.  Perhaps this is in recognition 
of the limited ability of America to influence what are internal Pakistani problems.  
 In summary, even if madrassas were the threat most Americans perceive 
them to be, there is largely little the U.S. can do in the short term to directly 
address the problem.  The U.S. public education policy for Pakistan seems a 
logical and much-needed first step and when combined with skillful public 
diplomacy may have an effect much later down the road.  In the short term, P.W. 
Singer of the Brookings Institute stated it well in saying that “in the end, reforming 
public education is a problem for Pakistan to solve.  The U.S. can encourage and 
aid the Musharraf regime in its efforts, but the final decision lies beyond the 
scope of American powers or responsibility.”263   
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